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COMPUTER ASSOCIATES V. ALTAI
Once a court has sifted out all elements of the allegedly in-
fringed program which are "ideas" or are dictated by effi-
ciency or external factors, or taken from the public domain,
there may remain a core of protectable expression. In terms
of a work's copyright value, this is the golden nugget.
- Hon. John M. Walker, Jr.'
All, as they say, that glitters is not gold.
- John Dryden2
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, courts have struggled to apply to com-
puter software the copyright standards developed since the late
eighteenth century3 to protect books and plays. Those tradi-
tional "literary works," which consist of fixed sequences of
words, directly reveal all levels of their structure, from individual
phrases to broad themes and plot elements, to their readers and
viewers. By contrast, computer programs generally consist of
coded instructions that would be unintelligible to the average
computer user, who usually interacts with them only through the
simplifying medium of the program's "user interface." The rela-
tive "opaqueness" of a program's structure to the layman reflects
his concern with its practical application over its architectural
aesthetics: to use a spreadsheet, word processor, or video game, it
1. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., Nos. 91-7893, 91-7935, 1992
U.S. App. LEXIS 14305 (2d Cir. June 22, 1992), modified, 982 F.2d 693, 710
(2d Cir. 1992).
2. THE HIND AND THE PANTHER, part 2, line 215 in THE POEMS AND
FABLES OF JOHN DRYDEN (James Kinsley, ed., Oxford University Press 1962)
(1687). Cf. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MERCHANT OF VENICE act 2, sc. 7 ("All
that glisters is not gold.") (Stanley Wells & Gary Taylor eds., Oxford Univer-
sity Press 1986) (1596/97); EDMUND SPENSER, FAERIE QUEENE, bk. 2, canto
7, stanza 14 ("Gold is not all that doth golden seem.") (Thomas P. Roche, ed.,
Yale University Press 1981) (1590); GEOFFREY CHAUCER, THE CHANOUN
YEMANNES TALE, line 962 ("But al thing which that shyneth as the gold/Nis
nat gold, as that I have herd it told.") in THE CANTERBURY TALES (Walter
Skeat, ed., Oxford University Press 1972) (c. 1390).
3. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, FINDING A BALANCE: COM-
PUTER SOFTWARE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE CHALLENGE OF
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 59 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov't Printing Office
1992) (copyright statutes enacted by American colonies in 1780s) [hereinafter
FINDING A BALANCE].
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should not be necessary for him to "look under the hood" of the
software.
Like the sentences of books and plays, the exact written in-
structions by which a program instructs the computer to process
data are protected by copyright. More controversial, however,
has been the copyright status of the "non-literal elements" of
computer programs, that is, of software's "structure, sequence
and organization," which correspond to the "plot, subplot, se-
quence of scenes, setting, characterization and patterns of dia-
logue in works of fiction or dramas; or ... the detailed outline
and organization and selection, coordination and arrangement of
information in textbooks or other nonfiction works." 4
To determine which elements of a computer program may be
copyrighted, and when such a copyright has been infringed,
courts have revisited the first principles of intellectual property
law, such as the distinction between (uncopyrightable) ideas and
(copyrightable) expressions, and the test for "substantial similar-
ity" between original and allegedly infringing works. In Com-
puter Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc. the Second
Circuit incorporated a variety of standard copyright principles
into a three-part "abstraction/filtration/comparison" analysis.
Under this procedure, a court analyzes a program from its most
specific to most general levels, strips away uncopyrightable mate-
rial to isolate a "golden nugget" of protectable (and connectable)
elements, and determines whether there has been unauthorized
copying of this copyrightable core. Though this test efficiently
combines familiar approaches to the protection of intellectual
property, it nonetheless raises both theoretical and practical
questions of its own.
Part II of this Article discusses the evolution of copyright pro-
tection for literal and non-literal elements of software. The fac-
tual background and legal analysis of the Computer Associates
decision are reviewed in Part III. Part IV examines the implica-
tions of the Second Circuit's new standard for copyrightability,
from its effect on competition in the software market to its im-
pact on the use of expert testimony and on the relative merits of
4. Id. at 69.
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copyrights and patents. Finally, Part V addresses the initial judi-
cial response to the Second Circuit's test, including its incorpora-
tion into two Court of Appeals decisions upholding reverse
engineering as a "fair use" of software.'
II. BACKGROUND
A. Protection of Literal Elements of Software
Because of their textual nature, the instructions that constitute
a computer program were accorded copyright protection rela-
tively quickly: a special Congressional commission expanded the
statutory category of "literary works" eligible for such treatment.
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution
authorizes Congress "(t]o promote the Progress of Science and
Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inven-
tors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discov-
eries." The Copyright Act of 19766 extended copyright
protection to "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression ... from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with
the aid of a machine or device."' 7 As one of the seven categories
5. The decisions analyzed in Part V refer to the Computer Associates opin-
ion as it was originally released on June 22, 1992. See supra note 1. This opin-
ion was withdrawn by the Second Circuit and superseded on rehearing by an
opinion handed down on December 17, 1992. The revised opinion did not
amend the enunciation or discussion of the "abstraction-filtration-comparison"
test for copyright infringement of software, on which this Article focuses.
Rather, the Second Circuit vacated, where it had earlier affirmed, the district
court's ruling that Computer Associates' trade secret claims had been pre-
empted. See infra note 186. The Computer Associates decision was released on
June 22, 1992. This Article covers developments in the area through January
31, 1993.
6. Act of October 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988)) [hereinafter the Act]. This Act superseded the
Copyright Act of 1909.
7. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. II 1990). Works are "fixed in [a] tangible
medium of expression" when their:
embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of
the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be per-
ceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more
than transitory duration. A work consisting of sounds, images, or
both, that are being transmitted, is "fixed" for the purposes of this
6 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19
of "works of authorship," "literary works" includes "works,
other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or
other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the
nature of the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manu-
scripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they
are embodied."'
A House Report accompanying the Act indicated that the is-
sues relating to the copyright status of computer programs were
"not sufficiently developed for a definitive legislative solution,"9
but stated that software fell within the category of "literary
works."' 10
In 1974, Congress created a Commission on New Technologi-
cal Uses (CONTU) to scrutinize this issue, among others."
CONTU's Final Report, issued in 1978,12 proposed that Section
101 of the Act define "computer programs"' 3 and that the copy-
right law "make it explicit that computer programs, to the extent
that they embody an author's original creation, are proper sub-
ject matter of copyright."' 14  Accordingly, the 1980 amend-
ments' s5 to the Act' 6 brought within the scope of copyright
title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its
transmission.
Id. § 101.
8. Id. § 101.
9. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, 116 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5731. However, § 117 of the Act addressed computer
uses of copyrighted works. 17 U.S.C. § 117.
10. The Report defined "literary works" to include "computer data bases,
and computer programs to the extent that they incorporate authorship in the
programmer's expression of original ideas, as distinguished from the ideas
themselves." H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 9, at 54, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667.
11. Created by Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 201, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974).
12. NATIONAL COMM'N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPY-
RIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT (1979) [hereinafter CONTU REPORT].
13. Id. at 12.
14. Id. at 1.
15. H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6482. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741,
750 n.6 (N.D. 111. 1983) ("Although the Congressional action in 1980 does not
appear to be supported by a legislative history, it is fair to conclude, since Con-
gress adopted its recommendations without alteration, that the CONTU Report
reflects the Congressional intent.").
16. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028.
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protection a "computer program," defined as "a set of statements
or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in
order to bring about a certain result."
17
The "first wave""8 of software copyright cases involved the rel-
ative protection to be granted to a program's "source code," that
is, to instructions "written in any of several programming lan-
guages employed by computer programmers." 1 9 The amend-
ment's phrase, "directly or indirectly," along with the Act's
existing policy of extending copyright protection to "original
works of authorship ... [that] can be perceived ... with the aid
of a machine or device," 2° led courts to expand the scope of such
copyright protection to include not only human-readable "source
code" but also machine-readable "object code,"'" the form in
which the program's instructions are implemented by the
computer.22
17. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
18. David Bender, Computer Associates v. Altai: Rationality Prevails, COM-
PUTER LAW., Aug. 1992, at 1, 2.
19. CONTU REPORT, supra note 12, at 21 n.109.
20. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
21. Source code as written by the programmer is transformed "within the
computer, through intervention of a so-called compiler or assembler program,
into an 'object code.' This last is most often physically embodied in the present
state of technology, in punched cards, magnetic disks, magnetic tape, or silicon
chips." CONTU REPORT, supra note 12, at 28.
As distinguished from object code, which refers to statements written in
"machine language, a binary language using two symbols, 0 and 1, to indicate
an open or closed switch," source code can be either "high level language, such
as the commonly used BASIC or FORTRAN, [which] uses English words and
symbols, and is relatively easy to learn and understand" or the interim form of
"assembly language, which consists of alphanumeric characters." Apple Com-
puter, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir. 1983),
cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984) (protecting both object code and source
code of operating system program).
22. See, e.g., Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 750 (N.D. Ill.
1983) ("It is certain as a general matter that the current copyright legislation is
intended to protect object code as well as source code."); Hubco Data Prods.
Corp. v. Management Assistance, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. 450, 454 (D. Idaho 1983)
(since CONTU Report and Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d
870 (3d Cir. 1982), specifically recognize copyrightability of object code under
17 U.S.C. § 102, plaintiff has a reasonable probability of success on such claim);
GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. 718, 720 (N.D. Cal. 1982) ("Because the
object code is the encryption of the copyrighted source code, the two are to be
treated as one work; therefore, copyright of the source code protects the object
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Thus, the Third Circuit, noting that "the copyrightability of
computer programs is firmly established after the 1980 Amend-
ments to the Copyright Act," rejected the notion that copyright
protection applied only to work "intended as a medium of com-
munication to human beings,"23 which qualification would have
excluded object code. Similarly, computer instructions embed-
ded electronically in the "ROM" computer chips of a circuit
board24 were accorded the same protection as those instructions
written on paper by programmers.2 5 One year later, the court
reiterated that "a computer program, whether in object code or
source code, is a 'literary work' and is protected from unauthor-
code as well."); Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp.
171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
23. Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 877 (3d Cir.
1982) (finding copyright infringement of object code responsible for the audiovi-
sual aspects of video game).
24. The electronic circuitry [of the coin-operated video game at issue
in Williams Electronics] includes a microprocessor and memory de-
vices, called ROMs (R cad 0 nly M emory), which are tiny computer
'chips' containing thousands of data locations which store the instruc-
tions and data of a computer program. The microprocessor executes
the computer program to cause the game to operate.
Id. at 872.
25. Id. at 874. The Second Circuit has also upheld the copyrightability of
program elements "imprinted" on PROM's, "Programmable Read Only Mem-
ory" chips. "The stored information in a ROM cannot be changed; it is im-
printed into the ROM when the device is manufactured. A PROM is a ROM
into which information can be imprinted (programmed) after manufacture;
once the information is programmed in a PROM, it cannot be changed simply
by writing in a new program." Stern Elecs. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 n.1
(2d Cir. 1982) (source code, as "the written computer program," eligible for
copyright; whether located in PROM prepared for video game in question or
elsewhere in game apparatus, all portions of program, once stored in memory
devices anywhere in game, are "fixed in a tangible medium" for purposes of
copyrightability). Cf Cable/Home Comm. Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902
F.2d 829 (11th Cir. 1990) (concerning copyright infringement of computer pro-
grams fixed in silicon chips contained in integrated circuit of video signal
descrambler).
But see Commissioner Hersey's dissent from the CONTU Report, to the ef-
fect that "copyright protection does not extend to a computer program in the
form in which it is capable of being used to control computer operations."
CONTU REPORT, supra note 12, at 1. Commissioner Hersey distinguished be-
tween traditional "[w]orks of authorship [which] have always been intended to
be circulated to human beings and to be used by them" and "[c]omputer pro-
grams, [which] in their mature phase, are addressed to machines." Id. at 28.
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ized copying, whether from its object or source code version."
26
By 1989, the Ninth Circuit could assert that "[s]ource and ob-
ject code, the literal components of a program, are consistently
held protected by a copyright on the program."'27 However, the
more problematic protection of the "non-literal components of a
program, including [its] structure, sequence and organization and
user interface," soon gave rise to a "second wave" of software
copyrightability cases.28 The determination of copyrightability
of non-literal elements was not only extremely fact-sensitive 29 but
was also subject to two seemingly flexible standards: the distinc-
tion between "idea" and "expression" and the evaluation of two
programs' "substantial similarity." 30 These standards determine,
26. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240,
1249 (3d Cir. 1983) (protecting object code version of operating system). See
also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984)
(object code is copyrightable).
27. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173,
1175 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding that nonliteral components of computer
software may be protected by copyright where they constitute expression rather
than ideas) (citing CMS Software Design Sys., Inc. v. Info Designs, Inc., 785
F.2d 1246, 1249 (5th Cir. 1986) (suggesting that source code is copyrightable)
and Apple Computer Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984)
(object code is copyrightable)).
See also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 45
(D. Mass. 1990) (parties agree as a general proposition that source code and
object code, if original, are copyrightable); Digital Communications Assocs.,
Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 454 (N.D. Ga. 1987) ("Case
law under the [Copyright] Act also clearly establishes that copyright protection
extends both to a program's source code, written in conventional human lan-
guage and symbols, and object code, written in machine readable binary lan-
guage.") (citing Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d
1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984)).
28. Bender, supra note 18, at 2.
29. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 1175. The Ninth Circuit found that the
relevant inquiry would concern whether "the component in question qualifies as
an expression of an idea, or an idea itself." Id.
30. "[T]he determination of the extent of similarity which will constitute a
substantial and hence infringing similarity presents one of the most difficult
questions in copyright law, and one which is the least susceptible to helpful
generalizations." 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A], at 13-27 (Matthew Bender ed., 1992) (emphasis in orig-
inal).
See also Anthony L. Clapes et al., Silicon Epics and Binary Bards." Determin-
ing the Proper Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 34
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1493, 1571 (1987) ("A determination of substantial similarity
10 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19
respectively, the degree to which copyright protection will be ex-
tended to a computer program and the manner in which an alle-
gation of copyright infringement of that program will be
investigated.
B. Protection of Non-Literal Aspects of Software
Although the source code and object code of software may
comfortably be compared to the text of books and plays, the
functional nature of computer programs limits the extension of
the analogy beyond the "literal" structures of these works.
Where different sets of coded instructions are alleged to have pro-
duced programs of similar arrangement and operation, courts
have reexamined the venerable distinction between the un-
copyrightable "ideas" underlying a work and copyrightable "ex-
pressions" of those ideas in the work itself. Once the
copyrightable elements of a program have been identified, their
unlawful duplication by another program has been determined
by a two-part test involving "substantial similarities" between the
programs.
1. Idea/Expression Distinction
A fundamental principle of copyright law is that such protec-
tion applies only to expressions of ideas, and not to the ideas
themselves. In the seminal case of Baker v. Selden,31 the
Supreme Court characterized as an uncopyrightable idea the
plaintiff's innovative method of accounting, and found the
printed forms produced by the plaintiff for the implementation of
his system were uncopyrightable, "as necessary incidents to the
art"32 of the new method. The Court thus denied the plaintiff
recourse against an alleged infringer of these forms.
The Copyright Act reflects the idea/expression distinction, by
providing that "[i]n no case does copyright protection for an
in a particular [software] case implicates, to a certain degree, a species of the
famous 'I know it when I see it' test. This is because authorship, virtually by
definition, is highly individualistic and the means of plagiarizing an author's
expression cannot be precast into inevitable, predefined categories . .
31. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
32. Id. at 103.
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original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, pro-
cess, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discov-
ery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work."
33
Nonetheless, the line dividing idea from expression is often elu-
sive. Judge Learned Hand recognized that
[t]he test for infringement of a copyright is of necessity vague.
In the case of verbal "works" it is well settled that although
the "proprietor's" monopoly extends beyond an exact repro-
duction of the words, there can be no copyright in the "ideas"
disclosed but only in their "expression." Obviously, no princi-
ple can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond
copying the "idea," and has borrowed its "expression." Deci-
sions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc.
34
The distinction between "idea" and "expression" has proven
particularly troublesome in the context of software. Although
CONTU addressed this issue, 35 courts have grappled with the
"hybrid nature of a computer program, which, while it is literary
33. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). The legislative history reveals § 102 was intended
"to make clear that this expression adopted by the programmer is the copy-
rightable element in a computer program, and that the actual processes or
methods embodied in the program are not within the scope of the copyright
law." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670, quoted in Allen-Myland, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 746 F.
Supp. 520, 532 (E.D. Pa. 1990). See also Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental
Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031
(1987); cf 35 U.S.C. § 101 (Patent Act protects, inter alia, processes and
machines).
34. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d
Cir. 1960) (protectingpendente lite ornamental design printed on cloth, in light
of high degree of resemblance between patterns).
35. The CONTU Report indicates that:
The "idea-expression identity" exception provides that the copy-
righted language may be copied without infringing when there is but a
limited number of ways to express a given idea. This rule is the logical
extension of the fundamental principle that copyright cannot protect
ideas. In the computer context this means that when specific instruc-
tions, even though previously copyrighted, are the only and essential
means of accomplishing a given task, their later use by another will
not amount to an infringement ....
When other language is available, programmers are free to read
copyrighted programs and use the ideas embodied in them in prepar-
ing their own works.
CONTU REPORT, supra note 12, at 20, quoted in Allen-Myland, Inc. v. IBM
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expression, is also a highly functional, utilitarian component in
the larger process of computing." 6
2. Substantial Similarity
To demonstrate infringement, a copyright owner must prove
two elements: (1) that it owns a valid copyright and (2) that the
defendant copied copyrightable portions of the plaintiff's work.
3 7
Although the second of these elements can be difficult to
demonstrate directly,3" such proof is not required by the Second
Circuit's standard test for copyright infringement, enunciated in
Arnstein v. Porter.39 Each phase of the Arnstein inquiry involves
its own "substantial similarity" analysis. First, copying can be
inferred from the alleged infringer's access to the plaintiff's work
if the works exhibit a "substantial similarity" that cannot be at-
tributed to the defendant's independent duplication of the plain-
tiff's efforts." Indeed, even if the plaintiff cannot demonstrate
access to its work, copying will be established if the similarities
between the works are "so striking as to preclude the possibility
of" independent development.41 Expert testimony is admissible
Corp., 746 F. Supp. 520, 532 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (CONTU Report serves as
legislative history of provisions recommended by CONTU).
36. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 712 (2d Cir.
1992). See also Steven R. Englund, Idea, Process, or Protected Expression?: De-
termining the Scope of Copyright Protection of the Structure of Computer Pro-
grams, 88 MICH. L. REV. 866, 893 (1990) (difficulty with relying upon
analogies to literary works is that computer programs are primarily utilitarian
in nature).
37. Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1092
(2d Cir. 1977). See also Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 206
(9th Cir. 1988); Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672
F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 880 (1982); Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir.
1977); Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976); 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 30,
§ 13.01.
38. Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir.
1970) (direct evidence of copying is rarely available).
39. 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (comparison of Cole Porter's musical
compositions with those of plaintiff disclosed similarities sufficient to support
finding of infringement if Porter could have had access to plaintiff's works).
40. "Of course, if there are no similarities, no amount of evidence of access
will suffice to prove copying." Id.
41. Id.
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in conducting an exacting comparison, or "dissection," of the
works to identify the elements of similarity.42
Second, once copying has been demonstrated, the plaintiff
must also show that the substantial similarities between the
works arise from the duplication of the copyrighted elements of
its own work.43 This proof involves the "ordinary lay [opinion]"
and not expert testimony. 44
In Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDon-
ald's Corp. , the Ninth Circuit dubbed 4rnstein 's two "substan-
tial similarity" tests the "extrinsic test," for the duplication of
uncopyrightable ideas, and the "intrinsic test," for the duplica-
tion of copyrightable expressions.46 The "extrinsic test," which
"depends not on the responses of the trier of fact, but on specific
criteria which can be listed and analyzed" by the process of "ana-
42. Id.
43. Computer Associates Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 557
(E.D.N.Y. 1991) (quoting Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 48 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986) (in turn quoting Hoehling v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841
(1980))), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). This se-
quence of elements was first enunciated by Arnstein v. Porter where the inquiry
involved "whether defendant took from plaintiff's works so much of what is
pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience for whom such
popular music was composed, that defendant wrongfully appropriated some-
thing which belongs to the plaintiff." Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 469, 473 (emphasis
added).
44. As Arnstein v. Porter involved "an issue of fact which a jury is pecu-
liarly fitted to determine ... even if there were to be a trial before a judge, it
would be desirable (although not necessary) for him to summon an advisory
jury on this question." 154 F.2d at 469. Indeed, the Second Circuit itself, in
rejecting the lower court's award of summary judgment in favor of the defend-
ant, did not compare the sheet music of the works, as a musical expert might
have, but instead listened to the compositions as played in the phonograph re-
cordings submitted by the defendant. Id.
45. 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding copyright infringement of
plaintiff's "H. R. Pufnstuf" television show by defendant's television
commercials).
46. Cf. Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, 843 F.2d 600, 606
(1st Cir. 1988) (under Arnstein test, trivial or minor variation between concrete
representations of animals will not preclude finding of infringement). "Substan-
tial similarity is an elusive concept, not subject to precise definition. It refers
only to the expression of the artist's concept, not the underlying idea itself; mere
identity of ideas expressed by two works is not substantial similarity giving rise
to an infringement action." Id. (emphasis added).
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lytic dissection" and by experts,47 evaluates the degree to which
uncopyrightable ideas have been duplicated.
The second Arnstein prong, or the "intrinsic test," is applied if
the extrinsic test reveals "substantial similarity in ideas, [since]
then the trier of fact must decide whether there is substantial
similarity in the expressions of ideas so as to constitute infringe-
ment."' 4 This test, which involves neither expert opinion nor an-
alytic dissection, "does not depend on the type of external criteria
and analysis which marks the extrinsic test."'49 Rather, the "re-
sponse of the ordinary reasonable person" determines whether
copying impermissibly extended to the protected "expression" of
an idea.5 °
In holding that the "McDonaldland" television commercials
infringed the copyrights of the "Living Island" scenario featured
on the children's television series, "H. R. Pufnstuf," the Ninth
Circuit emphasized that the inquiry of the intrinsic test extended
beyond the analytic dissection's mere comparison of elements to
encompass more comprehensive aspects of a work. Although
there were distinctions between the characters, setting and plot of
the two sets of television presentations, the extrinsic test's focus
on these alone would ignore McDonalds' duplication of the un-
derlying "intrinsic quality" which had made the "H. R. Pufn-
stuff" series the most popular Saturday morning programming
for children.51 In other words, "[w]e do not believe that the ordi-
nary reasonable person, let alone a child, viewing these works
will even notice that Pufnstuf is wearing a cummerbund while
Mayor McCheese is wearing a diplomat's sash."52
47. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562
F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977). "Such criteria include the type of artwork





51. Id. at 1166.
52. Id. at 1167. Krofft's extrinsic test has been attacked as adding little to
the determination of copyright infringement, since "it is not at all clear how one
could have substantial similarity of expressions without having substantial simi-
larity of ideas" and for "implicitly assumting] that one has already determined
the idea/expression line." William E. Hilton, Quantifying Originality: A Logi-
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Though the intrinsic test may penetrate to similarities between
the broadest structures of two works, it can still be informed by
analytic dissection's feature-by-feature comparison (and thus, by
expert opinion). The Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Brown
Bag Software v. Symantec Corp.53 finds analytic dissection rele-
vant to the intrinsic test's identification of copyrighted features
that have been copied into the defendant's program. "Under the
reformulated extrinsic test, we mean to perpetuate 'analytic dis-
section' as a tool for comparing not only ideas but also
expression." 54
The district court, after comparing in detail the "user inter-
faces"55 of the programs at issue, had denied summary judgment
to the defendant.56 In affirming this part of the holding, the
Ninth Circuit observed that Krofft does not prohibit comparing
program elements to determine whether copyrightable elements
of the plaintiff's program were copied by the defendant: in this
context, "analytic dissection is used not for the purposes of com-
paring similarities and identifying infringement, but for the pur-
cal Analysis for Determining Substantial Similarity in Computer Software Copy-
right Infringement Actions, 31 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 269, 289 (1991).
53. 960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 198 (1992).
54. Id. at 1475.
55. "Generally, this interface relates either to the display screens projected
on the cathode ray tube by the program (permitting the user to select various
options and/or to input data in prescribed format), or to the use of specific keys,
on the various standard keyboards, to perform particular functions." Bender,
supra note 18, at 2.
56. Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec Corp., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1991 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp.,
960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom. BB Asset Management, Inc. v.
Symantec Corp., 113 S. Ct. 198 (1992).
Brown Bag had contended that both outlining programs:
(1) Begin with a menu labeled "OPENING MENU," which is
shaded in a different color than the screen background and sur-
rounded by a single line box;
(2) Allow the user to select four of the same initial options, either
by means of a. "highlighting bar" (through use of the cursor arrows
and "enter" key) or by typing the capital letters corresponding to the
options;
(3) Display, in similar color schemes, a help line on the bottom of
the editing screen; a line around the screen; and, across the top of the
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pose of defining the scope of plaintiff's copyright."57 For
example, four years previously, the court had dismissed the simi-
larities between two video games depicting karate matches, as in-
herent in the idea of such a game; since the plaintiff could not
claim copyright protection for these features, a finding of in-
screen, file, cursor location, and window information, and a "menu
bar" listing available pull down menus;
(4) Provide similar procedures for the user to begin a new outline,
or to select an existing outline, from the opening menu;
(5) Use main editing screens for the entry and editing of data;
(6) Select new outline elements and pull-down menus in the same
manner;
(7) Permit the user to select directly from the main editing screen
certain of the commands displayed on the pull-down menus;
(8) Make available nine pull-down menus (four of whose titles
corresponded exactly, and the other five of which have the same or
similar functions); and
(9) Generally perform the same outlining functions.
12 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1994-95.
Despite these comparisons, the district court found that there was sufficient
difference between the programs to warrant the submission of the infringement
question to the jury. First, through analytic dissection it concluded that many
of the correspondences resulted from unavoidable, and thus unprotectable, ex-
pressions of "concepts... fundamental to a host of computer programs." Id. at
1995. Thus, the menu screens of both programs could, without infringement,
contain options to access files, enter data, edit, and print, which are "essential to
the very idea of a computer outline program." Id. Similarly, the blue back-
ground of both programs, chosen from a limited number of colors, could be
seen as a similar response to common considerations of user comfort, monitor
design, and the cultural associations of the color. Id. at 1995-96. Nor could the
use of pull-down menus be protected by copyright, since this idea and expres-
sion was, "if not standard, then commonplace in the computer software indus-
try." Id. Like the ideas behind them, features so basic to the programs at issue
did not qualify for copyright protection.
Second, the district court found that many of the copyrightable aspects of the
programs were not sufficiently similar to justify a finding of infringement. For
example, although the pull-down windows of both programs used letter abbre-
viations to select the option, they looked different and described the functions
differently. Id. at 1996. The opening menus of the programs offered different
options, overlapping only in those functions (opening or starting a new outline,
accessing an existing outline, accessing the directory, and quitting the program
altogether) that did not qualify for copyright protection. Id. In addition, the
options were described differently, had lettering of different sizes, and were ac-
cessible to the user through different menus. Id. The court concluded that
although the opening screens shared similar ideas, the screens were, as a matter
of law, not substantially similar. Id.
57. Brown Bag, 960 F.2d at 1475-76.
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fringement would not stand.58
In its own recent inquiry into software copyright infringement,
the district court for the District of Massachusetts distinguished
Arnstein's two prongs by the relative weights that they gave to
legal and factual considerations. 59 First, in establishing that the
substantial similarities are the result of actual copying of the
plaintiff's work, rather than of the defendant's independent de-
velopment, "'substantial similarity' simply means sufficient simi-
larity of a given element of a work to an element in the allegedly
infringing work to support a reasoned inference that more proba-
bly than not the element was copied from the copyrighted work.
... This is not similarity in a mixed law-fact sense but... in a
purely factual [and] evidentiary sense[, as] one of circumstantial
evidence of copying."'  On this issue, expert evidence and a "dis-
section" of the works in question is relevant.61
Second, once the copyrightable elements of the plaintiff's work
have been isolated, for the court to find that these elements were
copied by the defendant, they must bear such a "substantial simi-
larity" to their counterparts in the defendant's program that "an
'ordinary observer' [would find] that there was 'unlawful appro-
priation.' ,62 By definition, then, this prong of the test is clearly
a mixed question of fact (in determining the degree to which the
copyrightable elements are similar) and law (in determining
whether their appropriation was unlawful).63
Reflecting the increasingly blurred boundary between ques-
tions of high technology fact and questions of high technology
58. Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 209 (9th Cir. 1988).
The similarities involved: the number of moves and opponents allowed per
game; the various karate punches and kicks available to the player; the presence
of changing background scenes and one referee; the statements of the referee
and their depiction; the length of count-down rounds; and the provision of bo-
nus points. Id.
59. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l Inc., 788 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mass. 1992)
(plaintiff did not properly frame its allegations that defendant had infringed
copyright on elements of user interface).
60. Id. at 84.
61. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
62. Lotus Dev. Corp., 788 F. Supp. at 84 (quoting Concrete Mach. Co. v.
Classic Lawn Ornaments, 843 F.2d 600, 608 (1st Cir. 1988)).
63. Id.
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law, Computer Assocites continued the trend towards reliance on
expert opinion in evaluating allegations of software copyright in-
fringement. Each of the three steps in the Second Circuit's "ab-
straction/filtration/comparison" analysis would appear to
benefit, if not actually to require, the testimony of an industry
insider.
3. Early Precedent on Copyrightability of Non-Literal
Elements
Between 1978 and 1985, four district courts examined the de-
gree to which competitors could duplicate features of computer
programs and/or related documentation. Generally, their deci-
sions characterized elements integral to a program's structure as
uncopyrightable "ideas" and permitted their reproduction, even
when the plaintiff had arbitrarily chosen the specific configura-
tion of these features (e.g., the sequence of data input) from a
wide range of options. By contrast, the defendant's slavish copy-
ing or re-creation of non-essential features, or "expressions," was
found to constitute copyright infringement.
In Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co. ,'
the district court confronted the question of whether the plain-
tiff's copyrighted input formats for its computer program, as evi-
denced by the design of its manuals and input punch cards, had
been infringed by the defendant's nearly identical input manual.
Unlike the blank accounting forms of Baker v. Selden, which
were "[c]ertainly... not the subject of copyright,"65 these input
formats expressed "the sequencing of data for simplified access to
the computer programs. The formats by their placement of lines,
shaded art, and words tell the user what data to place where and
how to do it. It communicates the selection arrangements and
the sequence .... It follows that the formats are copyrightable if
the ideas they express are separable from their expression."66
The court questioned, though, whether a "separate idea"
would remain to be expressed if this sequencing and ordering
64. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
65. Id. at 1011 (citing Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879)).
66. Id. at 1012.
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constituted a protectable expression.6" In holding that the ar-
rangement of input was an unprotectable idea, the court analo-
gized the input format to "[tihe familiar 'figure-H' pattern of an
automobile stick [shift, which] is chosen arbitrarily [as the sole
configuration, among all possible configurations, to be imple-
mented] by an auto manufacturer." '68 Other auto manufacturers
could legally reproduce the same stick-shift pattern, as an idea,
on their own production lines, and could provide their customers
with their own literature, photographs, or films concerning the
shift's operation, "so long as these materials take the form of
original expressions of the copied idea (however similar they may
be to the first manufacturer's materials) rather than copies of the
first manufacturer's expressions themselves."'69
The necessary/unnecessary distinction has been employed par-
ticularly where the defendants have removed any literal similari-
ties in their code through the independent re-creation of the
plaintiff's code. In SAS Institute, Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys-
tems, Inc. ,70 S & H originally provided its programmers with the
entire source code of SAS's program.7 However, the program-
mers were subsequently isolated from this material and given the
tasks of re-creating different portions of the SAS program from
specifications that S & H had extracted from the SAS source
code.72 The court found copyright infringement of the plaintiff's
67. Id. at 1013.
68. Id.
69. Id. Since "[s]ubstantial portions of [the defendant's] manuals are verba-
tim from the [plaintiff's] manual," it was clear to the court that infringement
had occurred in the case before it. Id. at 1014.
70. 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1983).
71. Id. at 825.
72. Id. In this second phase, the "individual programmers would be as-
signed a particular, narrow task, and provided only that information relevant to
the task." One programmer, for instance, "was provided a specific statement of
the task to be performed by a program module, and was given information-
[only] as to the ways in which that module of code would interface with the
remainder of the [defendants'] product." Id. The defendants wrote the source
code linking the modules produced by the individual programmers to the re-
mainder of the defendants' product. Id.
If the S & H programmers had not previously been exposed to the SAS
source code, this process of duplicating a program would have qualified as a
"clean room" technique:
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statistical analysis software after determining that the similarities
between the programs were not dictated by necessity but instead
"represent[ed] unnecessary, intentional duplication of expres-
sion. " " In terms of substantial similarity, it appeared that evi-
dence remained of S & H's original approach to duplication:
"[i]t certainly cannot be said that 44 specific examples of [direct]
copying [of source code] as a matter of law were insubstantial.t
74
The court noted that many more examples of copying would un-
doubtedly have been brought to light had not the defendant "em-
barked upon its program of destroying and masking evidence and
disguising its conduct. '75 Significantly, the copying at issue ex-
tended beyond specific lines of code to the structure of the plain-
tiff's program itself.
However, on very similar facts to those of SAS, Q-Co Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Hoffman 76 declined to find copyright infringement
where the defendant had not re-created the plaintiff's source
code but instead had duplicated the structure and concept of
Software created by a second party through a "clean room" process
is created as follows: The second party forms two teams of program-
mers. The first team has access to the first party's source code and
writes a functional description of the program (Le., describes input,
output and constraints such as size of available memory) without dis-
closing in any way the method for accomplishing the results. The
written functional description (and nothing else) is transmitted to the
second team, which then creates software from that functional de-
scription. There is no other communication between the two teams
and no member of the second team has been exposed to the first
party's software. [Since] [m]any contend that developing software
from no more than a functional description does not infringe the
software's copyright, a properly implemented clean room technique is
regarded by most observers in the software industry as a lawful means
of creating competing software.
DAVID BENDER, COMPUTER LAW, SOFTWARE PROTECTION § 4.04(1], at 4-
22.2(23) n.12.10 (1992) [hereinafter COMPUTER LAW]. See generally NEC
Corp. v. Intel Corp., No. C-84-20799-WPG, 1989 WL 67434 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6,
1989) (code developed by clean room process indicates that similarities between
parties' programs resulted from constraints of hardware, architecture and
specifications).
73. SAS, 605 F. Supp. at 825. The court found "as a matter of fact that the
expression, and not merely the ideas" of the plaintiff's program were dupli-
cated. Id. at 829.
74. Id. at 830.
75. Id.
76. 625 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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plaintiff's arrangement of four program modules: "the same
modules would be an inherent part of any [tele]prompting
program."
7 7
Finally, in E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of America,7s the
court found that the computer program integral to the defend-
ant's logic trunked radio system79 infringed not upon the idea,
but upon the expression, of the plaintiff's copyrighted software."0
The court rejected the defendant's argument that the similarities
had been dictated by the goal of compatibility with the plaintiff's
system, since this goal could have been achieved without verba-
tim duplication of the plaintiff's program.8 ' The plaintiff, unlike
that in Q-Co, had introduced an element of originality "to the
compilation of standard programming techniques" sufficient to
defend its own copyright.82 The court characterized the extrin-
sic/intrinsic test of copyright infringement in the computer
software context as "problematical," since the intrinsic test
77. Id. at 616. Although the defendant had provided his assistant with only
that limited amount of information necessary to duplicate the four modules at
issue, and had himself written the source code to link those elements of the
completed teleprompter program, the court, expanding on Synercom's automo-
tive analogy, found that the "order and organization [of these modules] can be
more closely analogized to the concept of wheels for the car rather than the
intricacies of a particular suspension system." Id. In addition, by contrast to
the SAS defendant's wholesale copying of a program, the Q-Co defendant had
been forced to introduce significant modifications into the original program to
enable it to run on a different hardware package and in a different computer
language. Id.
The distinction between the holdings of SAS and Q-Co may also be attributa-
ble to equitable considerations. See infra note 132.
78. 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn. 1985).
79. "A logic trunked radio system is one consisting of mobile radio units,
typically installed in motor vehicles such as taxis, police cars, delivery trucks,
etc., and 'repeaters,' base stations which receive and transmit signals to and
from the mobile radio units. The heart of the [plaintiff's] system is computer
software contained in the mobile radios and repeaters." Id. at 1487.
80. Id. at 1503.
81. Id. at 1502 (citing Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725
F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984) and Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983)).
82. Id. at 1499-1500 (citing Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Com-
puting Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1010 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (computer manual copy-
rightable even though 30 percent of its content composed of excerpts from
material in public domain, since the assembly of old and new parts resulted in
original expression).
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would be difficult to apply: "any attempt to gauge the 'aura' or
'feel' of a computer program imbedded on a silicon chip is
doomed ab initio."
83
4. Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.
The necessary/unnecessary distinction made by the early cases
in software copyright was taken to its extreme by the Third Cir-
cuit in Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory,
Inc. 4 a "case of first impression in the courts of appeals.""5
Whelan restricted the noncopyrightable "idea" of a program to
that program's "purpose or function," thereby endorsing the pro-
tection of "everything that is not necessary to the expression of
the idea," 6 including the program's "structure, sequence and or-
ganization." 87 This narrow definition of "idea" has the potential
to restrict development of rival programs compatible with those
of an industry pioneer, because a program's general architecture,
in addition to its actual source code, would be protected as
expression.
Whelan addressed the alleged infringement of a computer pro-
gram designed to streamline the business operations of dental
laboratories.88 The court noted that the facts of the case before
it, and various commentaries on software development, indicated
that the cost- and labor-intensive aspect of software development
was not the coding of the program into computer language but
creating the program's "structure and logic."8 9
The plaintiff's ownership of the copyright and the defendant's
83. Id. at 1501 n. 16. The court reduced the "primary inquiry" in infringe-
ment cases to "whether the stated objective [of the programs at issue] can be
accomplished in only one or a few ways." Id.
84. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
85. Id. at 1224.
86. Id. at 1236.
87. Id.
88. The "significant [and, apparently, specialized] bookkeeping and admin-
istrative tasks" to be completed by such laboratories include: the registration
and processing of orders for equipment; maintenance of inventory; continual
updating of customer lists; and administration of invoicing, billing, and ac-
counts receivable. Id. at 1225.
89. Id. at 1231.
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access to this program were undisputed. 90 The plaintiff did not
allege that the source or object codes of its software had been
copied;91 indeed, the two versions of the program at issue had
been developed in different computer languages. 92 Thus, the only
issue before the Third Circuit was whether 93 there was substan-
tial similarity between the non-literal structure of the two works
in question sufficient to indicate copyright infringement.94
The court affirmed the district court's collapsing of the "ex-
trinsic/intrinsic" test advanced by Arnstein v. Porter.9 5 "The or-
dinary observer test, which was developed in cases involving
novels, plays, and paintings, and which does not permit expert
testimony, is of doubtful value in cases involving computer pro-
grams on account of the programs' complexity and unfamiliarity
to most members of the public." 96 In addition, it made little
sense to require the finder of fact applying the intrinsic test to
disregard the same expert testimony received while determining
the extrinsic test.97 Instead, the court adopted "a single substan-
90. Id. at 1232.
91. Id. at 1233.
92. Elaine Whelan, the programmer retained by Jaslow Laboratories (JL) to
develop management software for dental laboratories, wrote the program
Dentalab in EDL (Event Driven Language) for compatibility with IBM Series
One computers. Id. at 1226. After Rand Jaslow of JL had produced a similar
program, Dentcom, in BASIC, he gave notice of termination of the joint mar-
keting agreement then in force between JL and Whelan Associates (Whelan),
warning that JL considered itself the exclusive marketer of Dentalab. Jaslow
and other individuals subsequently formed a company to market the Dentcom
program in addition to (and as a new version of) Dentalab. However, Whelan
continued to market Dentalab. Id. at 1226-27.
After JL sued Whelan in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery
County, Pennsylvania, for misappropriation of trade secrets, Whelan brought a
copyright infringement suit against JL in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The District Court held that the struc-
ture, if not the literal code, of JL's Dentcom had infringed Whelan's copyright
in Dentalab. Id. at 1228-29 (citing Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab.,
Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1321-22 (E.D. Pa. 1985)).
93. A finding of infringement was subject to the defendant's ability to
demonstrate that it had developed its program independently and/or through
material in the public domain.
94. 797 F.2d at 1232-33.
95. Id. at 1232 (citing Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 609
F. Supp. 1307, 1321-22 (E.D. Pa. 1985)).
96. Id. at 1232.
97. Id. at 1232-33.
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tial similarity inquiry according to which both lay and expert tes-
timony would be admissible."9"
Noting that Baker v. Selden denied copyright protection to
blank forms precisely because these aids were so closely linked to
"the end sought to be achieved by Selden's book," (i.e., the im-
plementation of an uncopyrightable accounting system), "helan
enunciated a new version of the idea/expression distinction for
the software context:99 "the purpose or function of a utilitarian
work would be the work's [non-copyrightable] idea, and everything
that is not necessary to that purpose or function would be part of
the [copyrightable] expression of the idea .... Where there are
various means of achieving the desired purpose, then the particu-
lar means chosen is not necessary to the purpose; hence, there is
expression, not idea. ' ' l°° Under this analysis, the first developers
of a program for a specialized market could obtain a copyright
for all non-literal elements that could have been otherwise struc-
tured, even if all other arrangements would be comparatively
inefficient. Moreover, this approach would effectively abolish the
usefulness of "clean room" procedures, by which competitors re-
place the literal code, but retain the architecture, of original
programs. 0 1
Whelan rejected Synercom's implication that sequence and
98. Id. at 1223. The court noted that in both E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden
Corp., 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1493 (D. Minn. 1985) and Hubco Data Prods. Corp.
v. Management Assistance Inc., 2 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) T 25,229 (D. Idaho
Feb. 3, 1983) infringement determinations had been made entirely on the basis
of expert testimony, rather than that of a reasonable, average, or lay observer.
Id.
99. Id. at 1238. "Since it may be impossible to discuss the purpose or func-
tion of a novel, poem, sculpture, or painting, the rule may have little or no
application to cases involving such works." Id.
100. Id. at 1236. The Third Circuit upheld the district court's determination
that "[t]he 'expression of the idea' in a software computer program is the man-
ner in which the program operates, controls and regulates the computer in re-
ceiving, assembling, calculating, retaining, correlating, and producing useful
information either on a screen, print-out or by audio communication." Id. at
1239.
The court cited as support SAS Institute's reference to the "copying of the
organization and structural details" into the offending program. SAS Inst., Inc.
v. S & H Computer Sys., 605 F. Supp. 816, 830 (M.D. Tenn. 1985), quoted in
"helan, 797 F.2d at 1239.
101. J. Diane Brinson, Copyrighted Software: Separating the Protected Ex-
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form were less copyrightable in the computer context than in
others.10 2 To counter Judge Higginbotham's suspicion that a
program's sequence and organization could not be seen as expres-
sions of any separable idea, Whelan reiterated that "the idea [be-
ing expressed] is the efficient organization of a dental
laboratory."'' 0 3 A program designed for this purpose was distin-
guishable from software for general office efficiency or other ends,
and itself implemented only one of a number of possible ap-
proaches towards this goal. Thus, the Third Circuit extended
copyright protection to the structure, sequence and organization,
or "non-literal" elements, of the program at issue, including "the
manner in which the program operates, controls, and regulates
the computer in receiving, assembling, calculating, retaining, cor-
relating and producing useful information either on a screen,
print-out or by audio communication."'10
Recognizing the controversial nature of its approach to
copyrightability, the court attempted to pre-empt various lines of
anticipated criticism. First, it indicated that no sympathy should
be spared for a software developer who after investing significant
pression from Unprotected Ideas, A Starting Point, 29 B.C. L. REv. 803, 852-53
(1988). See supra note 72.
102. 797 F.2d at 1240. See also COMPUTER LAW, supra note 72, § 4.01, at 4-
4.4. (Synercom, which involved the copyright on the structure, sequence and
organization of a format form rather than of a program itself, does not contra-
dict Whelan and its progeny). Bender has criticized Synercom itself for "its
overly narrow choice of the fully detailed format as the idea, [which] departs
from logic and is contrary to well-established copyright precedent." Id.
§ 4.04[l], at 4-22.1.
103. 797 F.2d at 1240. The court observed that structure and organization
might rise to the level of uncopyrightable "idea" if the program's very idea or
purpose was to employ that structure or organization. Id. at 1238.
104. Id. at 1239 (citing Whelan Assocs., 609 F. Supp. at 1320). The specific
similarities leading to a finding of copyright infringement in Whelan were found
in: (1) the file structures in the two programs (which required, and ordered in a
particular fashion, specific information); (2) the screen displays of the programs;
and (3) the five subroutines of both programs. Id. at 1243-46. Significantly, the
substantial similarity analysis was not affected by the fact that screen displays
are covered by a different copyright category than is software, or by the fact
that the plaintiff had not argued that the displays infringed its work. Id. at
1244. Nor did the court accept the argument that substantial similarity could
be determined only after a comparison of a majority of the structure of the two
works: comparison of software, as of literary works, would proceed on a quali-
tative, not quantitative, basis. Id. at 1245.
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cost and effort managed to re-create a program's protectable non-
literal elements (through "clean room" techniques or otherwise)
without copying the source code or object code of the original:
not only would the cost to the infringer be irrelevant,' °5 but even
the "approximation" of the structure of a popular program
would afford her "a significant advantage over competitors. " 10 6
Second, the court evinced a willingness to sacrifice predictabil-
ity and ease of determination in order to expand copyright pro-
tection beyond software's "literal codes" to its non-literal
elements.'0 7 Nor would the new test retard the evolution of the
field. Whelan specifically rejected the argument that software de-
velopment is a uniquely self-cannibalizing enterprise, in which
each creation necessarily incorporates elements of its predeces-
sors: "We are not convinced that progress in computer technol-
ogy or technique is qualitatively different from progress in other
areas of science or the arts."' 0 8
Finally, the court dismissed as irrelevant the CONTU Report's
recommendation that copyright protection be extended to
software"° as the Report did not propose limiting such protec-
tion to literal elements of software,"o and since in any event the
Report "cannot be a substitute for legislative history in this
case." III
105. To this extent, the Third Circuit anticipated Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1290 (1991), which rejected the "sweat of
the brow" doctrine that would have afforded protection to factual compilations
whose "author" had invested substantial time in their assembly.
106. 797 F.2d at 1237.
107. Id. at 1238.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1241 (citing CONTU REPORT, supra note 12, at 1).
110. The court noted that the CONTU Report extended copyright protection
beyond source code and object code to flow charts. Id. (citing CONTU RE-
PORT, supra note 12, at 21).
111. Id. at 1241-42. Observing that the binding effect of the CONTU Report
as a "surrogate legislative history" has been predicated on the absence of Con-
gressional alterations to or committee reports on its recommendations, the
Third Circuit noted that "the only statutory provision relevant to this case is
§ 102(b) [precluding copyrightability of ideas] . . . to which no changes were
made as a result of the CONTU Report." Id.
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5. The Initial Response to Whelan
a. Criticisms
Although some courts have followed Whelan,"12 its "pur-
pose"-based analysis has by no means received unanimous sup-
port. For example, the Fifth Circuit, citing Synercom's gear-
stick analogy, refused to apply the Whelan test to protect the
sequence and organization of cotton-marketing software." 3 The
record reflected that the sequence and organization were largely
dictated by the structure of the cotton market." 4
In Autoskill, Inc. v. National Educational Support Systems
Inc., 5 the alleged copyright infringement concerned the devel-
opment of a program for the testing, diagnosis and treatment of
reading skills. The defendant's access to plaintiff's version was
undisputed. Comparing the programs' equivalent division of
functions (into three main sections), progression of lessons (from
simple to complex), training approaches, and feedback methods,
the district court for the District of New Mexico found the works
"substantially similar [in their] important aspects."' 1 6
To determine whether plaintiff's program for testing, diagnosis
and training of reading skills was itself copyrightable, the court
looked to Learned Hand's "increasing abstractions" test. 117 It
determined that the program's general purpose and orientation
towards three distinct reading-level subtypes identified by re-
112. See, e.g., Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc. v. American Express Bank Ltd., No.
88 Civ. 2103, 1990 WL 48098 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1990) (deferring to trial the
question of whether functions of plaintiff's compiler program were duplicated
by differently-structured rival programs, Le., whether plaintiff's program was
copyrightable under Whelan); Dynamic Solutions, Inc. v. Planning & Control,
Inc., 646 F. Supp. 1329 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (agreeing with Whelan's categoriza-
tion of inessential structural similarities as expressions); Healthcare Affiliated
Servs., Inc. v. Lippany, 701 F. Supp. 1142 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (infringement claim
rejected where plaintiff did not prove that choices made in development of pro-
gram at issue did not rise to level of structure, sequence or organization).
113. Plains Cotton Co-Op. v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d
1256, 1262 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 813 F.2d 407 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 821 (1987).
114. Id.
115. 793 F. Supp. 1557 (D.N.M. 1992).
116. Id. at 1560.
117. Id. at 1566 (citing Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d
Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931)).
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searchers in material available to the general public were un-
copyrightable ideas. Autoskill could copyright, as expressions,
its original training methods, but could not protect features that
were "dictated by the use of the English language"' 1 8 or "such
standard devices in reading programs that they cannot be consid-
ered in analyzing substantial similarity."' 19 After examining
both expert and lay evidence, as well as exhibits presented to the
court, the court found a "substantial similarity between the [de-
fendant's program] and the most important protectable aspects of
Autoskill's [p]rogram." 120
The court rejected "[t]he Whelan court's approach, [which,]
although a temptingly simplistic and bright line approach, can-
not account for the reality that many ideas may exist in a given
work.... Adopting the Whelan rule would also put a damper
upon the important goal of encouraging others to build upon the
ideas conveyed in a work." '121 Significantly, the court cited the
complexity of the programs as one factor in its decision not to
apply the "total concept and feel" test for copyright infringe-
ment, which "is more appropriate when evaluating simplistic
works where unanalytic evaluation is appropriate."' 
22
Whelan has been hailed by one commentator for bringing to
the idea/expression controversy an emphasis on the actual pro-
cess of software development, from the idea of a program's pur-
pose to the expression of the source code that implements that
purpose. 123 Yet even this evaluator has attacked the Third Cir-
cuit's analysis as technically vague and imprecise: it "adopt[s] a
118. Such features included the thirteen categories of vowel and consonant
combinations used in the program. Id. at 1560.
119. For example, silent sentences and silent paragraphs. Id.
120. Id. at 1569.
121. Id. at 1566.
122. Id. at 1570 (citing 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 30, § 13.03[A], at
13-37 to 13-41). This test, advanced in Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card
Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970), relies only on the impressions of the fact
finder, and not on expert testimony. "Because the court did not operate the
programs, in order to utilize this test I could only rely upon a few photos of
selected screen displays and a logic flow chart. Such a determination would not
be meaningful. I would need to rely upon the explanations and impressions of
the expert witnesses which [would be] inappropriate" for the application of the
"total concept and feel" test. Autoskill, 793 F. Supp. at 1570.
123. Bender, supra note 18, at 3-4.
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stilted view of what constitutes the 'idea' to be distinguished from
expression under copyright law." '24
Generally, legal scholars have elaborated on Autoskill's criti-
cisms of Whelan. First, the Third Circuit's restriction of "idea"
to the underlying purpose of a computer program has been seen
as "so abstract that it renders the idea/expression distinction fun-
damentally meaningless." 1 25 One program can have many differ-
ent levels of abstraction, each with its own idea: to protect as
expression everything but the most general of these ideas, that of
the program's purpose, effectively relegates all subsidiary ideas,
including those regarding the organization of each of the pro-
gram's sublevels, to the domain of copyrightable expression.
1 26
Second, Whelan had inferred from the Copyright Act's protec-
tion of compilations that the structure, sequence and organiza-
tion of software itself were copyrightable: 27  such protection
"would provide the proper incentive for programmers by protect-
ing their most valuable efforts, while not giving them a strangle-
hold over the development of new computer devices that
accomplish the same end."' 2' However, the Supreme Court's
later decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Ser-
vice Co. ,129 which declined to extend copyright protection to the
"white pages" of a telephone directory, resoundingly rejected the
"sweat of the brow" doctrine, under which "copyright has been
considered a reward for the hard work that went into compiling
facts."' 30 Thus, to the extent that Whelan can be said to have
124. Id.
125. Marc T. Kretschmer, Copyright Protection for Software Architecture:
Just Say Nol, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 823, 837 (1988).
126. Id. at 839.
127. "Title 17 U.S.C. § 101, defines 'compilation' as 'a work formed by the
collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected,
coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole con-
stitutes an original work of authorship,' and it defines 'derivative work,' as one
'based upon one or more preexisting works, such as ... abridgement, condensa-
tion, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed or
adapted.'" Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222,
1239 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
128. Id. at 1237.
129. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
130. Id. at 1291 (citing Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Pub-
lishing Co., 281 F. 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922) (copyright-
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relied on or endorsed that doctrine, it has been overruled. 31
Third, it has been suggested that the Third Circuit, incensed
by the defendant's blatant duplication of program elements,
manipulated the idea/expression test in order to find copyright
infringement. '
32
Fourth, the broad protection that Whelan offers to the struc-
ture, sequence and organization of programs "may force later
competitors to produce products that are markedly different
from the copyrighted product to avoid possible threats of copy-
right lawsuits.... This is a substantial barrier to a new competi-
tor entering a marketplace." 3 3  Moreover, requiring
programmers to develop new techniques to replace those pro-
tected by Whelan "duplicates effort and wastes resources."'
' 34
ability of compilation dependent on labor expended by author of work, and not
on public or non-public nature of collected material itself)).
131. Id. at 1295 ("[T]he 1976 revisions to the Copyright Act leave no doubt
that originality, not 'sweat of the brow,' is the touchstone of copyright protec-
tion in directories and other fact-based works.").
See, e.g., CMAX/Cleveland, Inc. v. UCR, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 337, 352 (M.D.
Ga. 1992) (declining to adopt Whelan analysis since the "sweat of the brow"
rationale underlying Whelan test has been rejected by the Supreme Court in
Feist and since Whelan test is inadequate to address complexity of computer
programs).
Cf supra note 105 (Whelan rejected "sweat of the brow" doctrine as applied
to infringers).
132. Kretschmer, supra note 125, at 838. See also John M. Conley & David
W. Peterson, The Role of Experts in Software Infringement Cases, 22 GA. L.
REV. 425, 434-35 (1988) (proposing that the SAS and Whelan courts found
plagiarism because their "evaluation of the defendants' conduct as fundamen-
tally inequitable influenced their views of the extent of copyright protection
available to software authors," while attributing difference in the Q-Co result to
the court's focus on absence of evidence of defendant's pervasive use of plain-
tiff's program).
133. William Wright, Litigation as a Mechanism for Inefficiency in Software
Copyright Law, 39 UCLA L. REv. 397, 418 (1991).
134. Peter Spivack, Does Form Follow Function? The Idea/Expression Di-
chotomy in Copyright Protection of Computer Software, 35 UCLA L. REV. 723,
752 (1988).
"[T]he Whelan rule distends copyright protection, placing off-limits alterna-
tive and improved means of expression and thereby upsetting the uneasy bal-
ance which copyright attempts to maintain by preventing free riders from
ripping off creative expression while not stifling others from improving or ex-
tending that expression." Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F.
Supp. 1006, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (granting Microsoft's motion for partial
summary judgment against infringement claim, since none of alleged similari-
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This restriction stifles the developers' culture of building on each
others' works and restricts the dissemination of efficient
subprograms. 
135
Whelan's insistence on divergence among competitive prod-
ucts burdens users unwilling to learn, or to be retrained for, sig-
nificantly different software to accomplish a given task. By
reducing incentives to improve the product and/or to lower its
ties in Microsoft Windows came close to being identical copy of corresponding
features in Apple products, and since each of the elements is subject to at least
one limiting doctrine, such as scenes a faire or merger) (citing Computer As-
socs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., Nos. 91-7893, 91-7935, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14305
(2d Cir. June 22, 1992)).
135. Spivack, supra note 134, at 752-55; Kretschmer, supra note 125, at 841-
42. Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Appli-
cation Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1082-83 (1989); Vance F. Brown, The
Incompatibility of Copyright and Computer Software: An Economic Evaluation
and a Proposal for a Marketplace Solution, 66 N.C. L. REV. 977, 997-98 (1988).
The same criticisms have been leveled against Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback
Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990); see discussion infra parts
V.B.I-B.3. See also Karen S. Kovach, Computer Software Design: User Inter-
face - Idea or Expression?, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 161, 185-86 (1991); Gregory J.
Ramos, Note, Lotus v. Paperback.- Confusing the Idea-Expression Distinction
and Its Application to Computer Software, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 267, 290 (1992)
(predicting that clone computers would no longer be manufactured, and that
"either IBM would be awarded a complete monopoly on microcomputers [us-
ing its proprietary Read Only Memory-Basic Input/Output System (ROM-
BIOS) component], or manufacturers would inundate the market with incom-
patible units."). But see N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 20, 1992, at D3 (Lotus's jubilant
full-page newspaper advertisement in the wake of Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland
Int'l, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mass. 1992), stating that "[w]e sued to protect
our intellectual property rights. And in winning we've helped preserve an envi-
ronment in which independent software developers can freely develop innova-
tive new products without fear that their creative work will be stolen. We sued
to protect innovation, not to stifle it.").
Two scholars of the Law and Economics movement have suggested that the
debate over the copyright protection of software's "look and feel"
will be resolved not by the semantics of the words 'idea' and 'expres-
sion' but by the economics of the problem and, specifically, by com-
paring the deadweight costs of allowing a firm to appropriate what has
become an industry standard with the disincentive effects on origina-
tors if such appropriation is forbidden. The probability that a particu-
lar display format will become the industry standard is small;
presumably there are significant returns over and above copyright to a
firm that achieves such a position; and the narrowly expressive aspects
of the display are protected, thus limiting the effect of free riding.
William Landes & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 28
J. LEGAL STUD. 345, 352 (1989).
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price, Whelan decreases competition, thereby entrenching the es-
tablished market leaders and further encouraging market (and
software) inefficiency.136
Finally, the Whelan test may be ignored by jurors who, instead
of applying its "purpose" criterion, may be "far more likely to be
swayed by the appearance that a defendant has copied from a
copyrighted piece of software."137
b. Extensions of Whelan
Although controversial, Whelan has become a factor in the
"third wave" of software copyrightability cases, which involve
protection of user interfaces.
38
Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World 139 broadened
Whelan's protection of a program's structure, sequence and or-
ganization to include screen displays. Broderbund found the
menu screens, input formats, and sequencing of screens in plain-
tiff's "Print Shop" program copyrightable because a nonparty
marketed a comparable product offering substantially the same
functions but through a user interface with a significant structure
and organization.""4 "[T]he separable idea of 'Print Shop' is the
creation of greeting cards, banners, posters and signs that contain
infinitely variable combinations of text, graphics, and borders. A
rival software publisher is completely free to market a program
with the same underlying idea, but it must express the idea
through a substantially different structure."'1
41
136. Wright, supra note 133, at 419; Spivack, supra note 134 at 753-54.
137. Wright, supra note 133, at 418-19.
138. Bender, supra note 18, at 2-3. "The third wave of cases represent a bold
attempt by software developers to focus on those aspects of the use of their
software that they view as commercially important. Having identified those
aspects, they have sought, by use of copyright, to exclude others from using
those aspects." Id.
139. 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
140. Id. at 1132-33.
141. Id. at 1133. See also Healthcare Affiliated Servs., Inc. v. Lippany, 701
F. Supp. 1142, 1152 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (entering summary judgment against
plaintiffs' copyright infringement claim, where plaintiffs had not demonstrated
that methodologies of their hospital management software comprised the
"structure, sequence and organization" of a computer program within the
meaning of copyright law and of Whelan).
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Broderbund found that Krofft's analytic dissection, or side-by-
side comparison of similarities, controlled the substantial similar-
ity inquiry. Noting that Whelan did not specify the role'of ana-
lytic dissection in determining substantial similarity, the district
court suggested that "an integrated test involving expert testi-
mony and analytic dissection may well be the wave of the future
in this area."' 42
Yet Digital Communications v. Softklone Distributing '43 noted
that Whelan had held only that the duplication of a program's
screen displays might be evidence of copying, and that the Third
Circuit had in fact supported the separate copyrighting of screen
displays as "audiovisual works."" Softklone thus denounced
Broderbund's protection of screen displays as based on "an over-
expansive and erroneous reading of Whelan." '145 In concluding
that the plaintiff's separate copyright on a "status screen" '146 had
142. 648 F. Supp. at 1136.
143. 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
144. Id. at 455 (citing Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797
F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986)).
145. 659 F. Supp. at 455. See also Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v.
CAMS, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 993 (D. Conn. 1989) (Broderbund overextended
scope of copyright protection of screen displays by misinterpreting Whelan's
statement that inferences of copying could be drawn from similarity of screen
displays).
146. The "status screen" screen display [of plaintiff's communication
program], which appears immediately following the "boot-up" or
sign-on screen display, contains in its upper portion an arrangement
and grouping of parameter/command terms under various descriptive
headings. Next to each of the parameter/command terms are values,
either numerical or verbal. The value of each parameter/command
reflects the value at which the program is operating and is either se-
lected by the user or by the computer program ("default settings"),
e.g., the number 300 next to the "SPeed" parameter/command indi-
cates the byte or baud rate at which the computer program is commu-
nicating with other computers. Two letters of each parameter/
command term are capitalized and highlighted. By typing those two
letters, the user can effectuate that specific command.
The lower portion of the status screen display, excluding the bottom
line, called the "window," can display a wide variety of text, including
anything the user might wish to cause to appear there. Upon typing
in a "HElp" command, the user can call up into the "window" a list
of all the [relevant] parameter/command terms. The list of terms is
arranged in four alphabetical groupings. Because of the size of the
list, all the terms cannot be displayed in the window at one time. By
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been infringed, Softklone itself specifically upheld Whelan's con-
clusion that blank forms could be copyrightable if sufficiently in-
novative.1 47  Unlike Synercom's non-infringing duplication of
format cards, Softklone involved the copying of the "arrange-
ment, headings, capitalization and highlighting" of the elements
on such a screen display. 148 The court identified as uncopyright-
able "ideas" the use of a screen to display the program's status,
the activation of commands by the typing of two symbols, 49 and
the use of commands to drive the program: "All of these ele-
ments relate to how the computer program receives commands
or instructions from the user and how operationally the com-
puter program reflects the results of those commands."' 15 By
contrast, other elements, such as the sequence of entry of the pa-
rameter/command terms and the highlighting and capitalization
pressing the "enter" key on the keyboard when the first portion of the
term is shown in the window, the remainder of the terms will appear.
The bottom line of the status screen is the "command" line. On
this line, the user can enter "commands" or instructions to the com-
puter to change the values at which it operates. After entering a com-
mand changing the operation of the program, the change is then
reflected by a change in the value next to the corresponding parame-
ter/command term in the upper portion of the screen. For example, if
the user wishes to change the byte or baud rate (speed) of the program
to 1200, he can type and enter the two letter symbol for the byte or
baud rate command along with the rate he desires, e.g., "SP 1200,"
the computer will then operate at a 1200 byte or baud rate, and the
number "1200" will appear in the upper portion of the status screen
next to the parameter/command term "SPeed."
659 F. Supp. at 452-53.
147. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1242-43.
148. 659 F. Supp. at 460.
149. Activation of the status screen is accomplished by:
the user typing on the bottom line of the screen two symbols, which
correspond to a particular command, usually followed by a value.
The computer then affects [sic] a change in the operation of the pro-
gram based upon the particular command and value involved and re-
flects the changed status of the program on the upper portion of the
status screen. As an example, if the user wishes the program to oper-
ate on a certain speed, e.g. 1200, the user can type on the bottom line
of the status screen the two symbols "SP" followed by "1200." The
computer will then operate at a speed of 1200 and that fact will be
reflected by the appearance on the upper portion of the status screen
of "1200" next to the term "SPeed."
Id. at 458-59.
150. Id.
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of two specific letters of such terms, were copyrightable since
they were unrelated to the actual operation or function of the
status screen. 15  The plaintiff's choices of the arrangements, pat-
terns and groupings of status screen elements were similarly
copyrightable as expressions, since they were "clearly not neces-
sary to the idea of a status screen" and, far from being dictated
by the nature of the screen itself, had been selected from among
"an almost infinite number" of options." 2
As indicated in Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. CAMS,
Inc., 153 the Copyright Office has thrown Softklone's validity into
doubt by refusing to accept registrations of screen displays sepa-
rately from registrations of the underlying software." 4 In re-
sponse, CAMS itself created a "legal fiction" that the single
registration of a computer program would also register "the
screen displays or user interface of that program, to the extent
that each contains copyrightable subject matter.
15 5
151. Id. at 460.
152. Id.
153. 706 F. Supp. 984 (D. Conn. 1989).
154. Id. at 991 (citing 36 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 155 (1988)).
Screen display registrations approved before this decision, however, remain
valid. Id. at 991 n.13.
155. Id. at 993. The court explained that this method would preserve the
approach of Softklone "by focusing on the copyrightable expression in each
type of registration and avoiding the mistake of identifying a program's idea of
a particular screen display or some element therein. It recognizes that a com-
puter program and its screen displays are, for copyright purposes, fundamen-
tally distinct [and thus] conforms to the realities of Copyright Office registration
procedures." Id.
CAMS refused to copyright the plaintiff's "programming conventions" in its
program for estimating the costs of machining manufactured parts. The court
found that because the locations of various items on the screen had been se-
lected from a very limited range of options, allowing copyright protection for
those items would preclude all future use of the substance. Id. at 995. Similarly,
the plaintiff's "internal method of navigation" to select or change functions or
entries was found to be constrained by the hardware on which the program
operated. Id. However, plaintiff's method of selecting "what should be made
part of the status report, arrangement of the terms therein, assignment of num-
bers to specific operations/departments and tools, and coordination in the man-
ner of building on the status report as the user progresses through to various
steps" was copyrightable, as an expression of "the idea of apprising the user of
the status of one's efforts in cost-estimating a part." Id. at 996.
19931
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III. COMPUTER ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL, INC V. ALTAI,
ING: TOWARDS A NEW SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY
ANALYSIS
A. Background
1. Parties and Products
Computer Associates' (CA's) program CA-SCHEDULER,
first available to customers in 1982,156 created and implemented
schedules for jobs to be run on IBM's System 370 family of main-
frame computers. 1" Depending on its size, each of the System
370 computers contained one of three operating systems: DOS/
VCE, MVS, or CMS.158 Operating systems, which control "the
resources of the computer, allocating those resources to other
programs as needed," '59 are mutually incompatible to the extent
that software written for one operating system generally cannot
be run on another.' 6°
However, a key sub-program, ADAPTER, saved CA-
SCHEDULER's users the cost and effort of purchasing and
156. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 554
(E.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
157. Id. at 550-52.
Programs that run on the same computer and operating system can
be divided into three types. The first, resident programs, reside in the
computer's memory where they run continuously. CA-
SCHEDULER and Altai's ZEKE are resident programs. A second
type, batch programs, are scheduled, started, and run to completion of
a particular job. The third group, server programs, are resident pro-
grams used by other programs to perform a service. ADAPTER and
OSCAR are both classified as server programs.
Id. at 549.
158. "DOS/VSE [is used] with the small-to-medium-size [System 370] com-
puters; MVS [is used] for larger computers and CMS for interactive com-
puters." Id. at 550.
159. Id. "Operating system software interacts with whatever other programs
are being used or 'executed' by the computer, providing computer resources
such as processors, memory, disk space, printers, tape drives, etc. for the other
programs that need them through what are often referred to as 'system calls.'"
Id.
160. "For [the] interaction [between the operating system software and pro-
grams being executed] to occur properly, the other programs must be compati-
ble with the operating system software in use on the computer, i.e., they must
be able to exchange information precisely and accurately with the operating
system to interact with those computer resources." Id.
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learning different versions of the same application to run on IBM
mainframes employing different operating systems, or of chang-
ing the operating systems themselves to avoid buying new pro-
grams. As an "interface" or "compatibility component,"
ADAPTER translated into the appropriate operating system lan-
guage the "system calls" issued by CA-SCHEDULER's "task-
specific" portion, whose own operation did not distinguish
among operating systems. 6 ' ADAPTER, which had also been
developed by CA'62 but which could not be used independently
of CA-SCHEDULER, 6 3 also streamlined CA's approach to
software development. 1"
Also in 1982, Altai first marketed its own job scheduling pro-
gram, ZEKE, for use exclusively with the VSE operating sys-
161. Id. at 551.
162. "ADAPTER was designed and written in 1979 for use with a group of
CA's programs called the DYNAM line. CA included a separate copyright
notice on ADAPTER with 1979 as the date of first publication. Since 1979,
there have been several revisions and changes to [the] ADAPTER code. CA
never registered ADAPTER in the copyright office as a separate computer pro-
gram." Id. at 552.
163. Id.
164. Id. The tripod approach to operating system compatibility also involves
drawbacks for the developer, who must
develop and maintain many different versions of the same program.
Changing the program or adding new features requires modifications
to all versions .... Marketing multiple versions of each product also.
increases the work required for development and maintenance....
This is a cumbersome way to develop and maintain products that run
on multiple operating systems.
Id. at 551.
By contrast, the division of programs into task-specific and interface compo-
nents benefits both the developer and the end-user.
First, to adapt a program to a new version of an existing operating
system or an entirely new operating system, the developer need only
modify the interface component .... Second, revisions to the task-
specific component of the program to correct problems or add features
will not affect the program's ability to run under all operating systems,
as long as the changes that request operating system services use the
interface component. This method is an efficient and effective way to
develop and maintain an application or system program that runs in
many operating systems. . . . [T]he end user can switch operating
systems and still use a given application or system program without
apparent differences.
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tern.' 65 In late 1983, James P. Williams, himself both a former
product manager for CA and Altai's sole programmer (and, at
the time of the litigation, Altai's president) 66 sought out CA
programmer and former co-worker Claude F. Arney III to help
Altai design a MVS-compatible version of ZEKE.167 Williams
had not worked on the development of, or seen the codes of, CA-
SCHEDULER or ADAPTER, and did not know that
ADAPTER was a component of CA-SCHEDULER. 6 Arney,
though, had helped CA develop the VSE version of
ADAPTER 69 and had breached his employment agreements by
taking to Altai copies of the source code for ADAPTER's VSE
and MVS versions.
170
Williams, who was unaware that Arney possessed the
ADAPTER code, proposed creating an MVS-compatible ZEKE
by modifying 30 percent of the VSE version of ZEKE.' 7' Ulti-
mately, though, he accepted Arney's suggestion that a "common
system interface" component be added to ZEKE.1
72
Arney took a month to design a VSE version and another three
months to produce a MVS version of this program, OSCAR.
71
Unbeknownst to Williams and the other Altai employees, Arney
derived 30 percent of OSCAR codes from his pirated copies of
CA's ADAPTER codes.' 74 From 1985 to August 1988, Altai
incorporated the first generation of OSCAR programs, OSCAR
3.4, into its programs ZEKE, ZACK and ZEBB.
75
In late July 1988, CA became aware of the apparent appropria-
tion of its ADAPTER code; in response, it copyrighted CA-
SCHEDULER and brought a copyright and trade secret misap-
165. Id. at 552.






172. The district and circuit courts' opinions do not indicate the extent to
which Arney and Williams discussed the similarity of this approach to that of
CA's ADAPTER.
173. Id. at 554.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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propriation action against Altai. 176 Only at this point did Altai
discover Arney's misappropriation of CA's source code. After
Arney admitted to Williams the extent of the copying, Williams,
who had not seen the ADAPTER code, had Arney specify the
sections of OSCAR 3.4 that had been derived from ADAPTER.
Williams then gave Altai's eight other programmers, none of
whom had worked on any version of OSCAR, the task of re-
creating those sections of OSCAR 3.4 to match ZEKE's require-
ments. 177 Six months later, in mid-November 1989, Altai re-
leased OSCAR 3.5 and provided it to purchasers of OSCAR 3.4
as a "free upgrade.
' 178
2. Procedural History
CA brought suit in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey in August 1988.179 CA alleged that in
developing the programs OSCAR 3.4 and OSCAR 3.5, Altai had
misappropriated CA's trade secrets and had infringed on CA's
copyright in ADAPTER.8s
In March 1989, the parties stipulated the transfer of the action
to the Eastern District of New York.18 '
After a six-day trial before Judge Pratt, who was sitting in the
district court by designation, 82 the district court entered judg-
ment on August 12, 1991.183
The court held that OSCAR 3.5 did not infringe CA's copy-
176. Id.
177. Id. "The process of rewriting involved first determining what operating
system services were needed by ZEKE; this list was formulated by reference to
the version of ZEKE marketed before OSCAR was developed. Williams pro-
vided a brief description of each service to a programmer through the parameter
lists, and told the programmer to write the appropriate code for obtaining that
service through the operating system." Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 549.
180. "CA is a Delaware corporation, with its principal place of business in
Garden City, New York. Altai is a Texas corporation, doing business primarily
in Arlington, Texas." Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693,
698 (2d Cir. 1992).
181. Id. at 700.
182. 775 F. Supp. at 549.
183. Id.
19931
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right on ADAPTER.1 14 Although Altai conceded that it had
misappropriated CA's trade secrets,18 5 the court held that
§ 301(a) of the Copyright Act preempted CA's trade secret
claim. 86 After an extensive review of the parties' damage analy-
184. Id. at 562.
185. Id.
186. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) "preempts 'all legal or equitable rights that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as
specified by section 106' when the work of authorship in which the rights are
claimed falls 'within the subject matter of the copyright as specified by sections
102 and 103 of the copyright act.'" 775 F. Supp. at 563.
The district court found that ADAPTER, as a computer program, was copy-
rightable, and that CA's trade secret claims were in fact "equivalent" to, and
therefore preempted by, its claims for infringement of its copyright. Id. at 565.
To that court,
[t]he alleged trade secret - ADAPTER - is the same entity in which
CA alleges a copyright. While the generic elements of a trade secret
and of a copyrightable work differ, the tort of misappropriation as
particularly alleged and proved here and the infringement of CA's
copyright boil down to the same thing - a right of action for the
unauthorized reproduction of, and preparation of derivative works
based on, ADAPTER. Merely because the elements of a "trade se-
cret" and a "copyrightable work" are different does not avoid
preemption.
Id. at 564.
Yet, the court suggested that if CA had made Arney a party and brought
claims based on the "illegal acquisition of a trade secret .... the preemption
analysis might be different, for there seems to be no corresponding right guaran-
teed to copyright owners by § 106 of the copyright act." Id. at 565.
In its June 22d opinion, the Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the district
court had gone "beyond the pleadings and, in reaching its preemption decision,
[taken] note of the case's factual environment" in isolating as the crux of both
Computer Associates' trade secret and copyright infringement claims the alle-
gation that Altai had copied ADAPTER into its ZEKE, ZACK and ZEBB
programs. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., Nos. 91-7893, 91-7935,
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14305, at *75 (2d Cir. June 22, 1992).
However, on December 17, 1992, after CA's petition for rehearing had di-
rected the court's attention to "portions of the record below that were not in-
cluded in the appendix for appeal," the Second Circuit withdrew its initial
opinion. Leaving intact its discussion of copyright protection for non-literal
elements of software, the court amended its analysis of the trade secret preemp-
tion issue.
The amended opinion vacated the district court's preemption ruling on CA's
claims for wrongful acquisition of trade secrets and remanded those claims to
the district court for a determination on the merits. Computer Assocs. Int'l,
Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 716 (2d Cir. 1992). The district court had
previously addressed the possibility that Altai had been on constructive notice
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ses, 8 7 the court rejected them both and engaged in its own esti-
mation, awarding CA $364,444 plus interest for damages
resulting from the infringement of ADAPTER by OSCAR
3.4.188
CA and Altai each appealed, but Altai ultimately abandoned
its appeal."8 9 The Second Circuit thus faced only the two issues
raised by CA on appeal.'9 ° CA challenged the district court's
determination that OSCAR 3.5 had not infringed on CA's copy-
rights and disputed the district court's method for comparing
OSCAR 3.5 with CA-SCHEDULER. CA also insisted that the
district court erred in determining that CA's claims against Altai
for misappropriation of trade secrets had been preempted by the
federal copyright act. 9 '
Although CA had copyrighted CA-SCHEDULER 2.1, which
contained ADAPTER, the certificate of copyright registration
identified this version as "derivative" of CA-SCHEDULER 1.0,
of Arney's breach of his confidentiality agreement with CA, which would have
placed Altai under a duty of inquiry. Moreover,
with regard to OSCAR 3.5, CA has a viable trade secret claim against
Altai that must be considered by the district court on remand. This
claim is grounded in Altai's alleged use of CA's trade secrets in the
creation of OSCAR 3.5, while on actual notice of Arney's theft of
trade secrets and incorporation of those secrets into OSCAR 3.4...
[w]here the use of copyrighted expression is simultaneously the viola-
tion of a duty of confidentiality established by state law, that extra
element renders the state right qualitatively distinct from the federal
right, thereby foreclosing preemption under § 301."
Id. at 719.
187. 775 F. Supp. at 567-71. 17 U.S.C. § 504 imposes copyright infringe-
ment liability in the amount of "the copyright owner's actual damages and any
additional profits of the infringer, as provided by subsection (b)." Subsection
(b), in turn, indicates that "in establishing the infringer's profits, the copyright
owner is required to present proof only of the infringer's gross revenue, and the
infringer is required to prove his or her deductible expenses and the elements of
profit attributable to factors other than the copyrighted work." 775 F. Supp. at
567.
188. 775 F. Supp. at 572.
189. Altai had originally appealed on the grounds, inter alia, that it was not
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which had never been registered. 192 Altai argued that the copy-
right thus extended only to the revisions of the original
SCHEDULER program itself, and not to its subsequently-added
subprogram, ADAPTER.' 93 However, the district court con-
cluded that, since "CA was the uncontested owner of the code [of
ADAPTER] when CA registered its copyright in CA-
SCHEDULER 2.1 as a derivative work, it was not required si-
multaneously to register separately every component part, such
as ADAPTER, of that work. Otherwise complete copyright pro-
tection for a complicated program developed by the same author
over a period of time would require dozens if not hundreds of
registrations." 
94
Both the district court and the Second Circuit assumed that
Altai had access to the ADAPTER code through Arney when it
developed OSCAR 3.5.19 Altai admitted copying ADAPTER
into OSCAR 3.4, but not into OSCAR 3.5. Thus, to sustain its
allegations of copyright infringement, CA was required to prove
(1) that OSCAR 3.5 and ADAPTER were so "substantially simi-
lar" as to indicate that Altai had copied ADAPTER into OS-
CAR 3.5 and (2) that such copying involved copyrighted
elements of ADAPTER.
B. The District Court's Approach
As the district court recognized, the nature of computer
software fosters new interpretations of the basic principle that
copyright protection applies not to ideas, but only to their expres-
192. 775 F. Supp. at 555.
193. Id. at 556.
194. Id.
195. The district court found that Altai had attempted "in good faith [to
develop OSCAR 3.5 independently of Arney's pirated ADAPTER code] and
adopted reasonable means to accomplish it," and in fact found that "neither
Williams nor any of the other programmers who worked on OSCAR 3.5 took
advantage of the ADAPTER code that was available to them, either by direct
copying or by indirect copying from OSCAR 3.4." Id. at 558. Nonetheless,
declining to resolve "the difficult factual issue that access presents in connection
with OSCAR 3.5," the court assumed such access. Id. The Second Circuit
adopted the same assumption "because we approve Judge Pratt's conclusions
regarding substantial similarity." Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 701.
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sion. 19 6 "In the context of computer programs, many of the fa-
miliar tests for similarity prove to be inadequate, for they were
developed historically in the context of artistic and literary,
rather than utilitarian, works."' 97 The court attacked Whelan's
"simplistic test for similarity between computer programs" as a
glaring example of this "inadequacy."' 98
Noting the commentary of Professor Nimmer, but relying
more heavily on the testimony of its own expert, Dr. Randall
Davis of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 199 the dis-
trict court found the Whelan analysis "fundamentally flawed.""'2°
The Third Circuit had erroneously assumed that each computer
program contained only one "idea," and that the remainder of
the program was protectable as a separate expression;20 1 yet
many complex programs contain various levels of subprograms,
each of which may include its own unprotectable ideas.20 2 Thus,
Whelan's narrow definition of "idea" would allow a developer to
monopolize not only an arrangement of subprograms but also the
subprograms themselves, even if these programs had approached
the level of ideas by becoming "so standard or routine in the
computer field as to be almost automatic statements or instruc-
196. 775 F. Supp. at 558 (citing Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880); Lotus
Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 42 (D. Mass. 1990); 17
U.S.C. § 102(b)).
197. 775 F. Supp. at 558.
198. Id.
199. The court appointed Dr. Davis in light of "the extensive technical evi-
dence and expert testimony anticipated from both sides." Id. at 549.
Under Federal Rules of Evidence 706(a):
The court may on its motion or on the motion of any party enter an
order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed,
and may request the parties to submit nominations. The court may
appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may ap-
point expert witnesses of its own selection .... A witness so appointed
shall advise the parties of the witness' findings, if any; the witness'
deposition may be taken by any party; and the witness may be called
to testify by the court or any party. The witness shall be subject to
cross-examination by each party, including a party calling the witness.
FED. R. EvID. 706(a).
200. 775 F. Supp. at 560.
201. Id. at 559 (quoting 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 30, § 13.03[F], at
13-78.33).
202. Id. at 559.
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tions written into a program. "203
As Dr. Davis stressed, Whelan had also failed to distinguish
between the "dynamic structure" of a program's "behavior," that
is, the sequence in which the program performs its operations,
and the "static" structure of the program's "text," or the order in
which the written program provides for such operations.2" In
fact, there is no necessary connection between the two forms of
structure: from a program's behavior "one can tell virtually
nothing about its text.9
20 5
The court rejected not only the "intrinsic/extrinsic" test of
Arnstein and Krofft but also Whelan's "purpose/expression"
test, in favor of an approach first advanced by Learned Hand in
the context of literary works and recommended by Dr. Nimmer
for application to software:
Upon any work.., a great number of patterns of increasing
generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the inci-
dent is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the
most general statement of what the [work] is about and at
times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this
series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since
otherwise the [author] could prevent the use of his "ideas" to
which, apart from their expression, his property is never
extended.206
The district court followed the "increasing generality" of the
various levels of the software's design, "from object code, to
source code, to parameter lists, to services required, to general
outline. ' 2 7 The relative importance of these factors in the "sub-
203. Id.
204. Id. at 559-60.
205. Id. at 559. The district court suggested that the "behavior" of a com-
puter program might qualify for patent protection instead of copyright protec-
tion, since 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) excludes "processes," "systems," and "methods
of operation" from such protection. Id. at 560. However, the issue was moot
"because CA's rights in this case are fully protected by viewing the ADAPTER
program as text." Id.
206. Id. at 560 (quoting Nichols v. Universal Pictures, 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d
Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931)). See also Sheldon v. Metro-Gold-
wyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936), rev'g 7 F. Supp. 837 (S.D.N.Y.
1934), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936).
207. 775 F. Supp. at 561. The Second Circuit observed that "[w]hile the
facts of a different case might require that a district court draw a more particu-
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stantial similarity" analysis were rated by an expert as 1,000
("code"), 100 (parameter lists), 100 (macros),2 °" 1 (services) and
1 ("[general] organization chart").2" The court found that there
was no substantial similarity between the codes of ADAPTER
and of OSCAR 3.5, since in creating OSCAR 3.5 Altai had re-
placed the ADAPTER code copied into OSCAR 34.21°
Although the two programs contained some similar macros and
lists of parameters, the great majority of these resemblances were
attributable to elements "in the public domain or dictated by the
functional demands of the program."2 ' In a direct renunciation
of Whelan, the court minimized the importance of any similari-
ties between the programs' organizational charts and their re-
spective lists of services.212 Therefore, the court held that
"OSCAR 3.5 was not substantially similar to CA's ADAPTER
program, that it was not copied from ADAPTER, and that it did
not infringe CA's copyright on ADAPTER as contained in any
of the registrations for CA-SCHEDULER.
2 3
C. The Second Circuit's Three-Part Test
In affirming the district court's decision, the Second Circuit
began from the "powerful" syllogism that "if the non-literal
structures of literary works are protected by copyright; and if
computer programs are literary work§, as we are told by the leg-
islature; then the non-literal structures of computer programs are
protected by copyright.9
21 4
Like the district court, the Second Circuit found that Whelan
displayed a "somewhat outdated appreciation of computer sci-
larized blueprint of a program's overall structure, this description is a workable
one for the case at hand." Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d
693, 714 (2d Cir. 1992).
208. For definition of "macros," see infra note 321.





214. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 702 (2d Cir.
1992).
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ence."211 Using the lower court's approach as "a road map for
our own,"2 16 the Second Circuit enunciated a new three-step test,
of "abstraction," "filtration" and "comparison," to determine the
substantial similarity of the non-literal elements of different com-
puter programs.
Step One: Abstraction
[A] court would first break down the allegedly infringed
program into its constituent structural parts.2
[I]n a manner that resembles reverse engineering on a theo-
retical plane, a court should dissect the allegedly copied pro-
gram's structure and isolate each level of abstraction
contained within it. This process begins with the code and
ends with an articulation of the program's ultimate function.
Along the way, it is necessary essentially to retrace and map
each of the designer's steps - in the opposite order in which
they were taken during the program's creation.2 18
215. Id. at 706. In particular, "each subroutine is itself a program, and thus,
may be said to have its own 'idea.'" Id. at 705.
216. Id. at 714.
217. Id. at 706.
218. Id. at 707. The court identified the steps in the development of a com-
puter program (presented in condensed form below) as follows:
(1) The identification of a program's ultimate function or purpose.
(2) The breaking down or "decomposition" of the program's ulti-
mate function into subtasks, which are also known as subroutines or
modules.
(2a) If necessary, breaking down these subroutines further, into
sub-subroutines.
(3) The arrangement of the subroutines or modules into organiza-
tional or flow charts, which map the interactions between modules
that achieve the program's end goal.
(3A) In order to accomplish these interprogram interactions, a
programmer must carefully design each module's parameter list,
which tracks the form and substance of information passed between
modules.
(3B) In fashioning the structure, a programmer will normally
attempt to maximize the program's speed, efficiency, as well as sim-
plicity for user operation, while taking into consideration certain ex-
ternalities such as the memory constraints of the computer upon
which the program will be run.
(4) Embodying the program's structure (the interrelationship of
the modules and their functions) in a written language that the com-
puter can understand, or "coding." This process involves:
(4.1) Transposing the program's structural blueprint into a
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In this connection, the district court had identified levels of
abstraction, in increasing order of generality, as: object code,
source code, parameter lists, services required, and general out-
line;219 it had proceeded to compare these corresponding ele-
ments of ADAPTER and OSCAR 3.5.220 It had also found
almost no copying of source code from ADAPTER to OSCAR
3.5.221
Step Two: Filtration
Then, by examining each of these parts [of the plaintiff's pro-
gram] for such things as incorporated ideas, expression that is
necessarily incidental to those ideas, and elements that are taken
from the public domain, a court would then be able to sift out all
non-protectable material.222
"source code," written in a computer language such as COBOL,
FORTRAN, BASIC or EDL; and then
(4.2) Translating or "compiling" the source code into "object
code," which is the binary language composed of zeros and ones
through which the computer directly receives its instructions.
(5) "Debugging" the program by running it on the computer in or-
der to find and correct any logical or syntactical errors.
Id. at 697-98.
Cf Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1229-31
(3d Cir. 1986) (identifying the stages of program creation, "moving from the
general to the specific," as: (1) identification of the problem to be solved by the
software; (2) outlining/flowcharting the solution, and the subroutines or mod-
ules that address specific aspects of the problems; (3) determining what data are
needed, where along the program's operations the data should be introduced,
how the data should be inputted, and how it should be combined with other
data, and implementing data files to facilitate the handling of data produced by
and used in the arrangement of subroutines and modules chosen; (4) coding the
program into language understandable by the computer, first into (a) source
code and then into (b) object code; (5) debugging the program; (6) documenting
the program by producing written material to explain to the user how the pro-
gram runs; and (7) maintenance of the program as the user develops new needs
for the program), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
219. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 560
(E.D.N.Y. 1991), afl'd in part, vacated in part, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
220. Id. at 560-62.
221. Id. at 562.
222. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707 (2d Cir.
1992). The Second Circuit noted that the filtration procedure should be applied
to the features of the allegedly infringed program - in this case, ADAPTER -
before the comparison of this program's "kernel" to the allegedly infringing
program. Id. This approach would preclude the consideration of irrelevant but
copyrightable elements of the defendant's program; in addition, it would ensure
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Besides "incorporated ideas," the "non-protectable material"
removed at this stage of the analysis includes elements dictated
by efficiency, elements dictated by external factors, and elements
taken from the public domain. Each of these categories corre-
sponds to an analogous doctrine in the literary copyright area.
The exclusion of elements dictated by efficiency parallels the
copyright doctrine of merger, which allows the copying of the
sole means of expressing an idea, on the grounds that "the idea
and its expression are inseparable" in that instance.22 3 Other-
wise, the use of the idea would be restricted to the copyright
holder. The most efficient programs, those that most closely em-
bodied the idea or process behind the program's structure, 2 4
might be able to assume only a few variant forms.22 5 Moreover,
similarities between programs in this regard might be attributed
to the industry-wide pursuit of efficiency rather than to
copying.226
The elimination from the copyrightability analysis of elements
dictated by external factors is analogous to the "scenes a faire"
doctrine, by which copyright will not extend to "'stock' or stan-
dard literary devices" necessarily linked to "a particular histori-
cal era or fictional theme. '2 27 The external factors giving rise to
that the comparison centered on the qualitative extent to which the defendant's
program incorporated elements of the plaintiff's. Id. at 706.
Although the district court had instead subjected OSCAR 3.5 to the filtration
analysis, the Second Circuit detected "no material impact on the outcome of
this case. Since Judge Pratt determined that OSCAR effectively contained no
protectable expression whatsoever, the most serious charge that can be levelled
against him is that he was overly thorough in his examination." Id. at 714.
223. Id. at 707-08 (quoting Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments,
Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 606 (1st Cir. 1988)).
Perhaps the prototypical application of the merger doctrine was Herbert Ro-
senthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 741-42 (9th Cir. 1971), in
which the Ninth Circuit found inextricable the idea and expression of a jewel-
encrusted pin in the shape of a bee. Given the extremely narrow range of types
of such ornaments, the Court declined to extend copyright protection, which
would amount to a monopoly, to one such version.
224. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 708.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 709 (quoting Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d
972, 979 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980)) (scenes involving German
beer halls, German greetings such as "Heil Hitler" and the singing of certain
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similarities among computer programs include:
(1) the mechanical specifications of the computer on which a
particular program is intended to run; (2) compatibility re-
quirements of other programs with which a program is
designed to operate in conjunction; (3) computer manufactur-
ers' design standards; (4) demands of the industry being ser-
viced; and (5) widely accepted programming practices within
the computer industry.2 2 s
German songs could appear in different portrayals of life in Nazi Germany
without giving rise to copyright infringement). The court cited Q-Co Indus.,
Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), in which four program
modules in a teleprompter program did not merit copyright protection because
they would be essential to any such computer program. Cf Burgess v. Chase-
Riboud, 765 F. Supp. 233 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (play about Thomas Jefferson's al-
leged relationship with slave "concubine" infringed on novel that elaborated on
slim historical account; many similarities between play and novel could not be
traced to any historical account).
See also Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 209 (9th Cir. 1988)
(similarities between two karate video games dictated by "constraints inherent
in the sport of karate itself," including "[t]he number of combatants, the stance
employed by the combatants, established and recognized moves and motions
regularly employed in the sport of karate, the regulation of the match by at least
one referee or judge, and the manner of scoring by points and half points ...
Because of these constraints, karate is not susceptible of a wholly fanciful pres-
entation.").
Whelan, citing this doctrine in support of its own holding that software com-
ponents necessary to implement the program's purpose were not copyrightable,
prefigured Computer Associates' removal of these elements from the copyright-
ability analysis. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d
1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
228. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 909-10 (citing 3 NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 30, at § 13.03[F][3], at 13-91, and Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n v.
Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256, 1262 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 821 (1987)) (upholding denial of injunction against alleged infringer on
grounds that externalities of cotton market led to similarities between pro-
grams). See Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 209 (9th Cir.
1988) (infringement claim rejected, in part because use of Commodore home
computer imposed design constraints on karate game design); Manufacturers
Technologies, Inc. v. CAMS, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 995 (D. Conn. 1989) (since
functioning of hardware package dictated type of navigational tools used in
software's screen displays, copyright protection denied to that aspect of pro-
gram). See also Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Medical & Scientific Communications,
Inc., No. 87 Civ. 0167 (JMC) 1992 WL 168190 at 24-25 (S.D.N.Y. June 30,
1992) (citing second step of Computer Associates analysis in denying, on com-
mon use or efficiency grounds, infringement claim alleging substantial similarity
due to use of hierarchy of menus, functional modules, external files and English
language).
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The Second Circuit exempted from copyright considerations
material in the public domain, "by virtue of freely accessible pro-
gram exchanges and the like"'22 9 or "if not standard, then com-
monplace in the computer software industry."23
The court observed that the district court had applied the fil-
tration analysis to OSCAR 3.5 rather than to ADAPTER,
thereby assuming the unnecessary duty of identifying protectable
elements in the defendant's program that might not be found in
the plaintiff's program and that would be irrelevant to the copy-
right infringement analysis.23' This approach would also tend to
minimize the effect of a "quantitatively small misappropriation
which is, in reality, a qualitatively vital aspect of the plaintiff's
protectable expression. '  However, since the district court had
found OSCAR 3.5 devoid of protectable expression, the results of
its analysis would not deviate from those that would have been
reached under the Second Circuit's test.2 33
The district court dismissed the majority of the similarities be-
tween ADAPTER's and OSCAR 3.5's parameter lists and
macros as derived from the public domain or as dictated by the
function of the program itself.234 Analogously, the similarities in
the lists of services required for the programs, and in the pro-
grams' respective organizational charts, were attributed to the
specifications of the operating systems and applications with
which ADAPTER and OSCAR 3.5 would be interacting.235
229. Computer Assoc&, 982 F.2d at 710.
230. Id. (citing Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1473
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 198 (1992) (quoting and affirming
Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec Corp., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1991, 1995-
96 (N.D. Cal. 1989))).
231. Id. at 714.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 714-15.
235. Id. at 715. CA claimed that the organizational chart of ADAPTER
was protectable even though the district court had found it "obvious" from the
nature of the program's operation. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,
775 F. Supp. 544, 562 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). However, the Second Circuit held that
the lower court had used this word to reflect that the organizational chart was
dictated by the nature of the program itself; it accordingly held the organiza-
tional chart uncopyrightable under the scenes a faire doctrine. Computer As-
socs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d at 715.
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Step Three: Comparison
Left with a kernel, or possibly kernels, of creative expression
after following this process of elimination, the court's last step
would be to compare this material with the structure of an alleg-
edly infringing program [to determine their substantial
similarity].236
At this point, the court's substantial similarity inquiry focuses
on whether the defendant copied any aspect of this protected ex-
pression [i.e., the "golden nugget" of the plaintiff's program], as
well as an assessment of the copied portion's relative importance
with respect to the plaintiff's overall program.
237
The district court had at this stage identified, as the OSCAR
3.5 elements that were both copyrightable and were similar to
those in ADAPTER, only a few of the parameter lists and
macros; that court concluded that CA had not proved the "sub-
stantial similarity" of these elements to their counterparts in
ADAPTER.2 3' Reviewing the court's factual findings under the
"clearly erroneous" standard, the Second Circuit found no
error.
239
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF COMPUTER ASSOCIATES
By its reliance on the testimony of a court-appointed expert, its
emphasis on identifying the "golden nuggets" of copyrightable
material in plaintiffs' programs, and its exclusion of efficiency-
dictated elements from such copyrightable cores, the Second Cir-
cuit has undoubtedly encouraged competitors to duplicate fea-
tures of best-selling computer programs. In this light, the court's
236. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 706.
237. Id. at 710.
238. 775 F. Supp. at 562.
239. Computer Assocs, 982 F.2d at 715 (citing Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 52). Under Rule 52,
[f]indings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge
of the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the
extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings
of the court.
FED. R. Civ. P. 52.
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suggestion that software developers might be better served by
patent than by copyright protection their programs seems worthy
of consideration.
A. Dangers of Expert Testimony
As noted above, 2" the Second Circuit had previously limited
the use of expert testimony in copyright cases to the initial deter-
mination of whether two works were so "substantially similar" as
to indicate copying. Upon a finding of copying, only the trier of
fact could evaluate whether the similarity was so great as to con-
stitute copyright infringement.241
However, that precedent assumed that the triers of fact "com-
prise[d] the audience for whom the [works at issue were] com-
posed."24 2 As the court recognized in Computer Associates, "the
highly complicated and technical subject matter at the heart of"
computer software claims would probably be "somewhat impene-
trable by lay observers - whether they be judges or juries - and
thus, [would] seem to fall outside the category of works contem-
plated" by the precedent on expert testimony.243 Thus, though
maintaining the restrictions on the expert's role in "judging sub-
stantial similarity in copyright cases that involve the aesthetic
arts, such as music, visual works or literature," the Second Cir-
cuit granted the district court the discretion to determine the use
of expert testimony in software cases. 2 " In this context, it noted
that the district court, although depending heavily on the ex-
pert's report to unravel the technological complexities of the
software infringement claim, had rightfully remained the trier of
fact.
245
Ironically, commentators have observed that the use of experts
240. See discussion of Arnstein v. Porter supra notes 39-42 and accompany-
ing text.
241. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 713 (citing Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d
464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) and 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 30,
§ 13.03[E][3], at 13-78.12 (expert analysis appropriate in comparison of two
works in their entirety)).
242. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473.
243. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 713.
244. Id.
245. Id.
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can divert the court's focus from the direct comparison of the
two programs at issue to "consideration of the behavior of the
author of the accused work." '246 This detailed testimony, then,
might be inappropriately applied to mask more equitable
analyses.
The growing reliance of courts on their own appointed experts
has also spawned procedural problems,247 including the lack of a
national referral system, the reluctance of potential witnesses to
expose themselves to cross-examination, and special difficulties in
discovery and ex parte communication.248 Ironically, the in-
court education of the judge may be hampered by the court-
room's own technological inadequacies.249
Even more dangerous are the substantive risks involved if the
expert unduly influences the court, particularly with regard to
interpretation of law.2"' In fact, at a recent symposium on com-
puter law, Stephen D. Kahn, counsel for Computer Associates,
246. Conley & Peterson, supra note 132, at 468. By contrast, the expert's
role in the determination of copyright infringement allegations involving
software generally revolves around the comparison and evaluation of similari-
ties in the programs' (1) names of variables and subroutines; (2) characteristics
of variables, arrays, modules and interfaces; (3) sequences in lists, tests and cal-
culations; (4) redundant code; (5) programmer's comments accompanying the
computer code; (6) threshold values and default options; (7) internal representa-
tion of options (for example, by particular digits); (8) perpetuated errors; (9)
output format; and (10) algorithms.
Id. at 453-68.
247. By contrast, "the patent code sensibly requires that the issue of obvi-
ousness be judged according to the opinion of an ordinary expert - that is, 'a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which [the invention's] subject matter
pertains'... . [and] wisely avoids reliance on the views of expert experts." John
S. Wiley, Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 144-45
(1991) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 103).
248. Sheila L. Birnbaum & Gary E. Crawford, Why Courts Hesitate To Ap-
point Experts, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 26, 1992, at 16, 18.
249. Victoria Slind-Flor, Tackling High Tech: Jurists Learn To Cope with the
Brave New World, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 19, 1992, at 1, 28 (quoting attorney obser-
vation that judges might request parties to prepare videotapes on the technical
background of CD-ROM's, but that courtroom design, "where it's hard to find
a blackboard or a grounded plug," does not support such information transfer).
250. Cf. Anthony L. Clapes et al., Silicon Epics and Binary Bards, 34 UCLA
L. REV. 1493, 1574 (1987) ("Expert opinion is particularly helpful in differenti-
ating independent development from copying in cases of comprehensive nonlit-
eral similarity of computer programs.").
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acknowledged that a full application of the first, or "abstraction,"
element of the Second Circuit's test could only practically be per-
formed by software experts. 251 He suggested, though, that the
Computer Associates district court had overly deferred to the
court's expert, Dr. Randall Davis, who had not only testified for
the copyright infringement plaintiff in Gates Rubber Company v.
Bando American, Inc. 252 but had become a lecturer on the sub-
ject after the Computer Associates decision was issued.253
Specifically, Kahn faulted Dr. Davis for testifying that Whelan
concerned a distinction between a program's "dynamic struc-
ture" (that is, the program's "behavior," or the sequence in
which it performs operations) and protectable "static" structure
(the arrangement of the program's "text" of coded instruc-
tions).254 While agreeing that a program's "behavior" was not
protectable by copyright, Kahn asserted that Whelan had fo-
cused neither on "behavior" nor on "static" structure in its Ap-
pendix A, a table comparing the sequence in which the order
entry modules of the two laboratory management programs re-
quested and manipulated data.255 Elsewhere, Kahn has re-
marked of Dr. Davis, "I am not challenging his good will....
But buried in the 60-page report we got 48 hours before the trial,
was a reference to Whelan as an 'infamous' decision. With hind-
sight, this tells me he had some views about Whelan. ' ' 256
To reduce the potential for a tyranny of experts in the wake of
251. Transcript of seminar on Computer Assoc. v. Altai, 6th Annual Com-
puter & Information Technology Law Institute, sponsored by The University of
Texas School of Law and The Computer Law Association, Dallas, Texas, Sept.
17, 1992.
252. 798 F. Supp. 1499 (D. Colo. 1992), modified, No. 92-S-136, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13601 (D. Colo. Aug. 12, 1992).
253. Id.
254. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
255. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1249
(3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987). The court reproduced this
"comparison of the order entry modules [as] characteristic of [the expert's]
comparisons of the other modules [which collectively were] probative, not dis-
positive of copyright infringements." Id. at 1248 n.46.
256. Victoria Slind-Flor, Will Ruling Impact Borland's Fall Trial?, NAT'L
L.J., July 13, 1992, at 19, 26.
Altai's counsel, Susan Braden, acknowledged that she had been more familiar
than Kahn with Dr. Davis' background before she suggested Davis' appoint-
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Computer Associates, the court and the parties should carefully
examine the expert and her potential biases, insist on a detailed
and comprehensive report, and clarify the degree to which the
expert's testimony relies on, reflects, or questions substantive law
in the area.
B. Effect on Software Developers
The Second Circuit dismissed the arguments of Computer As-
sociates that the new copyright restrictions of the abstraction/
filtration/comparison test would discourage the development of
software: "The interest of the copyright law is not in simply con-
ferring a monopoly on industrious persons, but in advancing the
public welfare through rewarding artistic creativity, in a manner
that permits the free use and development of non-protectable
ideas and processes.
'257
ment as the court's expert, but opined that Davis had not controlled the court.
Id.
Cf. Slind-Flor, Tackling High Tech, supra note 249, at 28 (software litigation
attorney quoted to effect that "[t]echnical experts are odd ducks.... They are
not really controllable. You pay your money, and then they get up there on the
witness stand and do what they want to do.").
257. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 711 (2d Cir.
1992). Indeed, the court found its approach compatible with that of Feist Publi-
cations v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., in which the Supreme Court had
invalidated the notion that "copyright was a reward for the hard work that
went into compiling facts." Id. (citing 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1291 (1991)). The Sec-
ond Circuit saw this abandonment of copyright's "sweat of the brow" doctrine
as weakening Whelan's argument that copyright protection of non-literal ele-
ments would "provide the proper incentive for programmers by protecting their
most valuable efforts." Id. (quoting Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1237). However,
Computer Associates did not mention that Whelan had itself refused to equate
exertion with copyrightability:
[F]act intensive works are given ... limited copyright coverage [be-
cause] there are only a limited number of ways to express factual ma-
terial....
The fact that it will take a great deal of effort to copy a copyrighted
work does not mean that the copier is not a copyright infringer. The
issue in a copyrighted case is simply whether the copyright holder's
expression has been copied, not how difficult it was to do the copying.
Whether an alleged infringer spent significant time and effort to copy
an original work is therefore irrelevant to whether he has pirated the
expression of an original work.
797 F.2d at 1236-37. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
Foreshadowing Computer Associates, the Third Circuit added, "[e]ven if the
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In this vein, commentators have generally predicted that the
"restrictive multi-step test" of Computer Associates will inhibit
software market leaders from bringing copyright infringement
actions, since the court would then define in detail those elements
of their programs that would be permissible targets of copying. 258
However, competitors could profitably apply the lessons of
Computer Associates even without recourse to a court-commis-
sioned copyrightability map. Guided by their own legal and
computer consultants, aggressive developers could dissect, for in-
stance, all leading spreadsheet models to map their similarities at
all levels of abstraction, from object code through source code to
overall structure. After identifying the common features that
might qualify as "ideas," those that might be dictated by the na-
ture of the program or the hardware, and those that seem to be
dictated by efficiency concerns, developers could then choose the
level of infringement risk they would assume by selectively incor-
porating more or fewer of these features into their programs. 259
product of the alleged infringer's efforts is a mixture of old and new elements,
that would not protect it from the charge of infringement." Id. at 1237 n.32.
258. Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Computer Law: Copyright Protection
for Software Redefined, N.Y. L.J., July 14, 1992, at 3, 7. Computer Associates
has generally been characterized as "a blow to major computer companies seek-
ing to protect best-selling programs" because it indicates that "competitors may
be able to copy important elements of those programs and thereby grab market
share." Jonathan S. Moses, Court Eases Copyright Rules on Software, WALL
ST. J., June 24, 1992, at B1.
See also Lee Gesmer, Decisions May Signal a Judicial Turnabout, NAT'L L.
J., Jan. 18, 1993, at S2, S4 ("It is likely.., that the flood of software copyright
infringement cases triggered by Whelan will slow to a trickle as plaintiffs en-
counter the challenges created by Computer Associates."); Richard Brandt et
al., Bit by Bit, Software Protection Is Eroding, Bus. WK., July 20, 1992, at 86-87
("[C]ompetition in this industry will probably increase as entrepreneurs feel le-
gally safer. It could also reduce the number of legal victories awarded to mar-
ket leaders [such as Lotus] who now rush to court when rival programs seem to
imitate their work.").
259. The Computer Associates analysis should throw a new light on the pro-
tection of "object-oriented" programs. See, e.g., John W. Verity & Evan I.
Schwartz, Software Made Simple: Will Object-Oriented Programming Trans-
form the Computer Industry?, Bus. WK, Sept. 30, 1991, at 92 [hereinafter
Software Made Simple]. The major advantage of this new trend in technology
is the ability to build large programs from lots of small, prefabricated
ones. That's possible because objects completely change the tradi-
tional relationship between programs and data, which have been
strictly segregated for 40 years. As the old term "data processing"
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C. Appropriateness of Software Copyrights
1. Copyright v. Patent
Computer Associates observed that "the indiscriminating avail-
ability" of copyright registration may not be appropriate for "the
highly dynamic technology of computer science," since it forces
courts to "attempt to fit the proverbial square peg in a round
hole." 2"
As one commentator has noted, "[t]he traditional distinction
implies, programs ordinarily act on data - simple lists of numbers or
customer names, for example. An object, in contrast, encapsulates
programs and data in one self-contained unit, which fully describes
some real-world entity....
This simple idea provides tremendous benefits. Software objects
can be built to represent just about everything - from an abstract
concept, such as an insurance policy, to a specific thing or person,
such as Duke Ellington, American composer and musician, 1899-
1974. More important, objects can be created that perform certain
common tasks - sorting, for example. Once perfected, such objects
are infinitely reusable, so programmers don't have to reinvent the
wheel every time.
Id. at 94.
It remains to be seen how an object-oriented program would fare under the
Whelan test if it served the same "purpose or function" as another such pro-
gram or as less advanced software.
In either of the situations, the more comprehensive analysis of Computer As-
sociates would examine the various structural levels of the plaintiff's program.
The "abstraction" analysis of an "object-oriented" program would encompass
not only its general function and the manner in which it had been assembled
from "objects," but also the structure of the "object" subprograms themselves.
Under a broad interpretation of the "filtration" step, the structure of the pro-
gram and of the "objects" would be uncopyrightable if the court found that
their design had been dictated by efficiency. Moreover, program elements that
are in the public domain, or are necessary for compatibility with the specific
hardware and software used would also remain subject to copying by competi-
tors. See Software Made Simple, supra, at 98-100 (Object Management Group,
including more than 160 computer and software makers and customers, is cur-
rently attempting to develop electronic system to distribute software objects
across networks involving many different types of computers; Digital Equip-
ment, Sun and Hewlett-Packard are collaborating to produce necessary
software). An "object's" original arrangement of information might qualify for
copyright protection; finally, the information contained in each object might be
copyrightable in its own right.
The "comparison" test would match the copyrightable features of the "ob-
ject-oriented" program to the features of an allegedly infringing program.
260. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 712.
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between the two domains is that patent excludes unauthorized
practice of an invention, whereas copyright excludes unauthor-
ized copying of a writing. For the most part, the demarcation
between these two domains is reasonably clear. But a problem is
posed by the computer program, because it appears that in this
area uniquely, the medium is the message. "261
The Patent Act of 1952, as amended,262 protects "any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
or any new and useful improvement thereof, ' 263 so long as the
work is both "novel" 2'  and "non-obvious. ' 265 However, "the
issue of statutory subject matter is still largely undefined and in a
state of constant flux."'266 The two-step test generally employed,
while roughly analogous to copyright law's "idea versus expres-
sion" distinction, does afford protection for certain ideas, or
"mathematical algorithms," that are applied to natural processes:
First, does the claim directly or indirectly recite a mathe-
matical algorithm? If not it is not barred by § 101. But if the
claim recites a mathematical algorithm, step two must be ad-
dressed: Is the mathematical algorithm either (a) imple-
mented in a specific manner so as to define structural
relationships between physical elements of the claim (appara-
tus) or to refine or limit certain steps (process), the claim be-
ing otherwise statutory [Le., patentable], or (b) applied to
process steps themselves part of an overall statutory process?
If so, the claim is statutory; if not, it may be non-statutory. In
the application of the second step, the claim should be given
its broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the spec-
ification. Moreover, the claim must be analyzed as a whole;
dissection such that the mathematical algorithm is considered
prior art, with the remainder of the claim tested under § 102,
is improper.2 6 7
261. COMPUTER LAW, supra note 72, § 3A.09, at 3A-86.2. Bender notes
that "there is no software case discussing the potential conflict [between copy-
right and patent protection]. [I]n previous instances of conflict the patent has
proven to be a survivor." Id. at 3A-87.
262. 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-376 (1988).
263. Id. § 101.
264. Id. § 102.
265. Id. § 103.
266. COMPUTER LAW, supra note 72, § 3A.01, at 3A-2.3.
267. Id. at 3A-2.3 to 3A-2.4. Bender indicates that:
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These determinations remain fact-sensitive despite several
Supreme Court decisions in the area.268 Indeed, "the lower
courts have been comparatively silent on the issue of statutory
[N]o case appears to define just what constitutes a mathematical
algorithm. Rather, the cases tend, without discussion, to denominate
each algorithm in question as mathematical or non-mathematical.
Accordingly, the counselor is left to the process of induction in an
attempt to discern one from the other. In the context in which the
claim language arose, courts have held as follows.
"Calculating" a difference recites a mathematical algorithm. "Sum-
ming" electrical signals to form another electrical signal appears to
recite a mathematical algorithm... but a claim reciting a mathemati-
cal algorithm which converts electrical signals into another form is
statutory. This last conclusion holds even though the physical appari-
tions comprising the electrical signals can be expressed in mathemati-
cal terms. Finally, steps such as "executing," "compiling,". "storing"
and "examining" formulas do not directly or indirectly recite mathe-
matical algorithms, mathematical formulas, or calculations.
Id. at 3A-3.
See also Walter A. Effross, Software Related Patent Is OK'd, COMPUTER
LAW STRATEGIST, Apr. 1992, at 1 (analyzing Arrhythmia Research Technol-
ogy v. Corazonix, 958 F.2d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1992), in which the court extended
scope of patentable subject matter to include process and apparatus for elec-
tronically analyzing cardiograph signals).
268. Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the copyright protec-
tion of computer software programs, it has recognized the patentability of
software-related inventions. COMPUTER LAW, supra note 72, § 3A. 11, at 3A-
95 (inclusion of algorithm and programmed digital computer did not render
process for molding raw synthetic rubber nonstatutory, since these elements
were applied in structure or process which, when considered as a whole, is per-
forming a function which patent laws are designed to protect, such as trans-
forming or reducing an article to a different state or thing) (citing Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981)). Cf Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (denying
patent protection to method for calculating alarm limits in catalytic chemical
conversion of hydrocarbons, because algorithm the only novel aspect of
method, because remainder of method poorly described, and because claim
would broadly preempt similar uses of algorithm); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63 (1972) (general method of conversion of data from binary-coded-deci-
mal form to binary form not patentable, since conjoined neither to apparatus
nor to specific application, and since patent protection would preempt underly-
ing mathematical formula).
The Patent Office's guidelines on evaluation of claims including mathematical
algorithms and software do not automatically deny patent protection to
processes or inventions including such elements. COMPUTER LAW, supra note
72, § 3A.04, at 3A-50.16 (discussing "Patentable Subject Matter - Mathemati-
cal Algorithms or Computer Programs, " Manual of Patent Examining Proce-
dures § 2110 (1981)).
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subject matter in the computer program context.
'269
The relative advantages of patent protection over copyright
protection in the software context 270 are: the ability to exclude
others from employing the software's algorithms, as opposed to
prohibiting merely the expression of the program's underlying
"idea"; the ability to prosecute those who have independently
created the program; the absence of any requirement that the
plaintiff prove copying of its work by the defendant; the clearer
identification of the protected elements of the program;271 and
the lack of a requirement that these elements be treated by the
plaintiff as trade secrets. In addition, patent holds the promise of
protecting in one integrated form the entire "business methods"
involving computer programs.
2 72
The disadvantages of this form of protection include: the un-
certainty regarding the scope of the Patent Act's § 101 as applied
to software;273 a patent's cost to obtain and maintain; its inappli-
269. COMPUTER LAW, supra note 72, § 3A.03[2], at 3A-46.
270. Id. § 3A.10, at 3A-88 to 3A-89.
271. Cf. Randall M. Whitmeyer, A Plea for Due Process: Defining the Scope
of Patent Protection for Computer Software, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 1103, 1136
(1991) (despite apparent advantages in proving patent infringement, copyright
infringement may be less difficult to prove than at first appears: element of
copying is often easy to prove because of program's widespread availability or
parties' previous contractual relationship, and programmers can place idiosyn-
cratic instructions, or "fingerprints," in their programs to reveal copying).
272. COMPUTER LAW, supra note 72, § 3A.07, at 3A-68.1 to 3A-68.2 (dis-
cussing patents for various computer-related apparatus for industrial use. Por-
tions of the relevant patent documents are reproduced as appendices to
Bender's treatise).
Bender also notes industry rumors that the developers of "a highly successful
spreadsheet program" had been advised during its development that it could
not be patented; suggesting that "today such a patent application might well be
held to claim appropriate subject matter, and issue as a patent," he raises the
specter of monopolization of entire new fields of software by those "who think
they've got the next spread sheet" and are obtaining patents on their software.
Id. § 3A- 11, at 3A-96 to 3A-97.
273. Two recent decisions by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
have raised new questions regarding the scope of § 101 of the patent law. See
E. Robert Yoches, Once More into the Breach: The U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office Renews Its Attack on Subject Matter Patentability of Computer Programs,
15 COMPUTER REP. 863 (1992) (analyzing Ex Parte Akamatsu, Appeal No. 91-
3230 (Mar. 20, 1992) and Ex Parte Alappat, Appeal No. 91-12778 (Apr. 22,
1992), both of which strictly construe § 101 in the context of "means-plus-func-
tion" elements).
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cability to data bases 2 7 4 and to documentation; the enforceability
of patent claims only against conduct that occurs after the issu-
ance of a patent, a process which itself may take two years; its
limited duration of seventeen years; 275 the unsettled status of the
availability of injunctive relief under patent law; the ability of
competitors to obtain the patent itself as a public document; and
the implementation in antitrust suits of consent decrees setting
limits on the royalties at which the parties can license their
patents.
276
274. However, Feist appears to have limited significantly the range of
databases that can be copyrighted. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
Generally, a database qualifies for protection under the Copyright Act as a
"compilation," or "[a] work formed by the collection and assembling of preex-
isting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a
way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of author-
ship." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). However, the Act limits the copy-
right compilation to "the material contributed by the author of such work, as
distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work." 17 U.S.C.
§ 103(b).
Under this analysis, Feist declined to protect as a compilation a telephone
directory's "white pages," which listed names, addresses, and telephone num-
bers. When determining whether a fact-based work is an original work of au-
thorship rather than a mere collection of facts, the Court held, the primaiy
emphasis should be on the "selection, coordination, or arrangement" of the
facts. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1293
(1991).
275. COMPUTER LAW, supra note 72, § 3A. 10, at 3A-89 (citing 35 U.S.C.
§ 154). However, "[c]opyright has a term of protection which, in the software
milieu, can only be called extraordinary - generally the author's life plus fifty
years, or (for anonymous works, pseudonymous works, and works made for
hire) seventy-five years." Id. § 4.02, at 4-4.12 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-305).
Moreover, there are indications that the effective term of patent protection
provides more than adequate safeguarding of some forms of computer-related
technology. See, e.g., Edmund Andrews, Rich in the 90's on Ideas Hatched in
the 50's, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1992, at At, (profiling inventor who was paid a
total of more than $100 million by "more than a dozen big companies" in previ-
ous year on patents "based on inventions dating back to the 1950's, for auto-
mated manufacturing systems that use robots and computerized machines that
can see"; indicating that inventor subdivided some of his earliest patents and
nursed them through Patent Office so thai some of his decades-old inventions
did not receive patents until previous year); Edmund Andrews, There's Cash in
Mining the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1992, at D2 (Texas Instruments
amassed hundreds of millions of dollars more in royalties in the last year or two
by demanding licenses to old patents on computer chip technology than it made
from selling products).
276. COMPUTER LAW, supra note 72, § 3A. 10[2].
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While it remains an open question whether these drawbacks
outweigh the advantages of software patents,277 an increase in
patent filings by software developers is expected in response to
the current uncertainties regarding copyright protection.2
2. Report of the Office of Technology Assessment
Noting that courts and a commentator had proposed that pat-
ent registration might be more suitable than copyright for pro-
tecting intellectual rights in software, the Second Circuit
observed that "the resolution of this specific issue could benefit
from further legislative investigation - perhaps a CONTU
II. ' '279 While such a commission has not yet been convened, in
277. The length of the patent prosecution period is generally not a ma-
jor impediment (and is becoming even less troublesome). Moreover,
the commercial lifetime of the invention embodied in, or in the appli-
cation of, the software, if worthy of a patent, is likely to be at least
several years. Enforcement of patents has become less difficult. And
the perception that source (or even object) code need be disclosed and
published to secure the patent is generally just plain incorrect.
Id. § 3A- 11, at 3A-96 (footnote omitted).
By contrast, another leading commentator has eliminated patent law
as a viable option for the protection of most application program code.
Most programs, though products of significant efforts to define, out-
line, and implement a method for performing tasks on a computer,
simply do not manifest sufficient novelty or non-obviousness to merit
patent protection. Even for those programs that are novel and non-
obvious, the time and cost of obtaining protection may not be worth
the effort, particularly if the product is not expected to have a long life
cycle. Furthermore, to obtain a patent, the inventor must disclose the
art to the Patent Office and ultimately to the public. The inventor
might very well wish not to do this, for such disclosures would facili-
tate access by others to the inner workings of the patentee's invention
and would destroy any trade secrecy claim.
Peter Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application
Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1076 (1989) (footnotes omitted).
278. Brandt, supra note 256, at 88.
279. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 712 (2d Cir.
1992) (citing Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 560
(E.D.N.Y. 1991); Lotus Dev. Corp.y. Borland Int'l, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 78, 91
(D. Mass. 1992); Randall M. Whitmeyer, A Plea for Due Processes: Defining the
Proper Scope of Patent Protection for Computer Software, 85 Nw. U. L. REV.
1103, 1123-25 (1991)).
The CONTU Report itself suggested:
Any legislation enacted as a result of these recommendations should
be subject to periodic review to determine its adequacy in the light of
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May 1992 the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA) released a 228-page report entitled Finding A Balance:
Computer Software, Intellectual Property and the Challenge of
Technological Change.28
In reviewing this area, the OTA identified "three principal pol-
icy areas that Congress may wish to address": the appropriate
scope of copyright protection for software, the scope of patent
protection for software-related inventions, and the applicability
of copyright law to users of digital information."' While the
third of these topics is beyond the scope of this article, the OTA's
treatment of the first two issues reveals the degree to which both
copyright and patent protection remains unresolved in the
software context. Although the OTA did not make definitive
recommendations, the sweeping nature of the options considered
indicates that these areas may merit radical change.282
continuing technological change. This review should especially con-
sider the impact of such legislation on competition and consumer
prices in the computer and information industries and the effect on
cultural values of including computer programs within the ambit of
copyright.
CONTU REPORT, supra note 12, at 3.
280. See FINDING A BALANCE, supra note 3. Among the nineteen members
of the OTA's Advisory Panel for this investigation was none other than the
ubiquitous Dr. Randall Davis, the court's expert in Computer Associates and the
plaintiff's expert in Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Am., Inc., 798 F. Supp. 1499
(D. Colo. 1992). See infra note 300 and accompanying text.
281. FINDING A BALANCE, supra note 3, at 28.
282. The Office of Technology Assessment noted that, with respect to each of
these issues, Congress faced the questions of whether to act at all, when to act,
and how comprehensively to act. Id. at 28-29. In lieu of introducing comple-
mentary or sui generis patent and/or copyright regimes tailored to computer
software, Congress might elect to "explicitly affirm the status quo," to "make
small adjustments at the margins of copyright and patent (e.g., through proce-
dural changes)" or "clarify or modify the scope of patent and/or copyright
(e.g., through definitional changes), but leave the basic paradigms the same."
Id. at 29.
While Congress could avoid immediate action and instead continue to survey
the developing law and technology,
incremental accommodations through the case law may conflict over
time, as the case law continues to evolve. As is the case with current
legal uncertainties, the uncertainties that ensue will affect smaller/
poorer firms and individuals (that do not have the resources to "ride it
out") more than large firms with deep pockets.
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Among the alternative proposals to clarify the protection of
software are:
1. Revising the Copyright Act's Section 102, which speci-
fies the "subject matter of copyright," explicitly to include or
to exclude computer languages, algorithms, design specifica-
tions, user and other interfaces, and/or other aspects of
software;
2. Creating a special category for computer programs in
the Copyright Act, rather than treating them as "literary
works";
3. Confining the treatment of software as a "literary work"
to the code as text, rather than including the program's opera-
tional behavior or its user interfaces, which could be ad-
dressed by new statutory provisions;
4. Removing computer programs entirely from the scope
of copyright protection, and protecting them instead "under a
sui generis framework, including protection for the program
code, as well as other elements of program functionality and
design."283
Similarly, the report suggested that Congress "[riefine the defi-
nition of patentable subject matter to provide guidance to the
courts and [Patent Office]," particularly with regard to whether
processes incorporated in software or mathematical algorithms
are patentable; alternatively, it proposed the creation of a special
patent framework, characterized by "a shorter term, lower crite-
ria for inventiveness, and/or special exemptions for infringe-
ment" for "software-related inventions and/or algorithms.
'284
V. PROGENY OF COMPUTER ASSOCIATES
In the first seven months since its original release, the Com-
puter Associates test was cited by several courts in varying con-
texts. One decision emphasized the test's elimination of
efficiency-dictated elements from the copyrightability analysis;
2 5
283. Id. at 30-32.
284. Id. at 33.
285. In Softel v. Dragon Medical & Scientific Communications, Inc., No.
CIV. 0167 (JMC), 1992 WL 168190 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 1992), the plaintiff
sought to protect as copyrightable:
(1) the mere use of hierarchical menus, which, the court noted, were "one
of the most efficient and user-friendly interfaces." Id. at *24;
(2) the use of functional modules, although "the evidence established that
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another found it inapplicable to a situation in which the defend-
ant admitted taking, reproducing and using without modification
copies of the plaintiff's program.28 6 Although Computer Associ-
ates had specifically declined to address whether screen displays
were copyrightable as "audiovisual works,"2 7 the Second Cir-
cuit's rejection of Whelan was cited as support for denying copy-
right protection to a user interface.2 8  However, another court
has found a plaintiff's file structures, screens and reports, and
programmers commonly write code in modules which perform each necessary
subtask" and though this feature, in any case, would require the additional fac-
tor of the modules' interrelationships to qualify as a structural element." Id.;
(3) the use of external files, which "are commonly used in interactive com-
puter programs because of the extensive amount of information which must be
organized." Id.; and
(4) the use of English language commands, which use was "logical, perva-
sive, and the most effective way that the programmer can keep track of the
available commands." Id. at * 25.
However, the district court applied the Computer Associates test to filter out,
as "merely stock elements which are commonly used or mandated by efficiency
considerations," all of the elements of medical diagnosis programs that the
plaintiff had asserted were copyrightable, and thus was not required to perform
the third step of the test. Id. The court emphasized that "after Altai it is now
settled law in this Circuit that expression which is standard or the most efficient
means of accomplishing a task merges with the idea and is not entitled to copy-
right protection." Id.
286. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 803 F. Supp. 487 (D.
Mass. 1992).
287. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 703 (2d Cir.
1992).
288. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Cal.
1992) refused to protect the cumulative "look and feel" of the Apple Macin-
tosh's graphical user interface, the individual features of which were duplicated
by rival programs, Microsoft's Windows 3.0 and Hewlett-Packard's NewWave,
in their operation on non-Macintosh computers.
However, the five similarities claimed by Apple were each subject to a limit-
ing doctrine, such as scenes a faire or merger, which would render them unpro-
tectable "ideas":
(1) use of windows to display multiple images on a computer
screen and facilitate interaction with the information contained in the
windows;
(2) use of icons to represent familiar objects from the office envi-
ronment and facilitate organization of information stored in the com-
puter's memory;
(3) manipulation of icons to convey instructions and to control
operation of the computer;
(4) use of menus to store information or functions of the com-
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transaction codes copyrightable under the "abstraction-filtration-
comparison" analysis.
289
puters in a place that is convenient to reach, but saves screen space for
other images; and
(5) opening and closing of objects as a means of retrieving, trans-
ferring or storing information.
Id. at 1026.
Citing Synercom's comparison of input formats to the stick-shift arrangement
of an automobile, the Second Circuit analogized the visual displays and user
commands of the Macintosh's user interface to the car's "dashboard, steering
wheel, gear shift, brakes, clutch and accelerator." Id. at 1023 (citing 462 F.
Supp. at 1013). Their unusual metaphoric nature, the court concluded, would
not overcome the interface's "purely functional" status, and thus its
noncopyrightability. Id.
The court agreed with Computer Associates that Whelan overly favored mar-
ket leaders at the expense of those who were "stifi[ed] from improving or ex-
tending that expression." Id. at 1025. It observed that "some visual displays
are or become so closely tied to the functional purpose of the article that they
become standard," as evidenced by the "almost invariable incorporation of [fea-
tures of the Macintosh's graphical user interfaces] in most graphical user inter-
faces." Id. at 1023. To allow Apple to copyright "for decades," id. at 1025, the
interfaces in Windows and NewWave would "produce its own negative effects
by inhibiting the adoption of compatible standards [which] would enlarge the
market for computers by making it easier to learn how to use them." Id.
289. CMAX/Cleveland, Inc. v. UCR, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 337, 352-53 (M.D.
Ga. 1992), rejected Whelan's idea/distinction test in favor of the Computer As-
sociates three-step test. In determining that the defendant had infringed plain-
tiff's software, which was designed to aid the management of "rent-to-own"
furniture and appliances, the court found the following non-literal elements of
the plaintiff's program copyrightable:
(1) "file structures," that is, the selection and arrangement of field defini-
tions within a file. Id. at 354 (citing Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859,
862-63 (2d Cir. 1984) (extending copyright protection to subjective selection
and arrangement of items)). Since these structures were "not alphabetic or
otherwise systematic, [or] functionally significant in any respect," they were not
found to be dictated by the industry. Id.
(2) screens and reports, under the same analysis as above. Id. at 355; and
(3) transaction codes, which
tell a computer how to act on a transaction. The idea behind a trans-
action code is that it is an abbreviated representation of a shortcut to
the execution of a particular transaction. Plaintiff's expert testified
that transaction codes were a major part of program design, that they
could be anything, and that they were unique to the particular system
designed. Defendants' expert did not testify that these codes were dic-
tated by efficiency or by the industry. Rather, he testified that it
would not make sense to change the codes because then the employees
who were familiar with the [plaintiff's] transaction codes would have
to learn new ones. This is not an external factor, which would negate
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Of particular interest are two district court decisions constru-
ing the Computer Associates test. In Colorado, the Second Cir-
cuit's analysis has been used in conjunction with that of Whelan;
in Massachusetts, the three-step test has been compared favora-
bly to the district court's own.
Finally, recent decisions by the Circuit Courts of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have cited Computer
Associates in legitimizing the practice of reverse engineering, a
technological practice which itself may generate even more occa-
sions for the application of the "abstraction/filtration/compari-
son" test.
A. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando American, Inc.29o
The district court for the District of Colorado employed the
Computer Associates test as a fail-safe, to remove from the
copyrightability analysis any program elements that are "ideas"
and would survive Whelan. Though counteracting Whelan's re-
striction of a program's "idea" to its purpose, the Gates Rubber
test perpetuated the Third Circuit's conflation of expert and lay
testimony.
Gates Rubber Company, the leading manufacturer of indus-
trial belts, alleged that competitor Bando American's program,
Chauffeur, had infringed Gates' copyright in Design Flex 4.0, a
program used by salesmen in the field to determine the appropri-
ate replacement belts for customers. The programs employed
identical mathematical formulas and constants in designing
drives and determining belt size.29'
After a hearing limited to the appropriateness of awarding in-
junctive relief to Gates, the court found "more than ample evi-
dence to support the inference that [Bando] had access to the
Design Flex program. '292 Moving to the second prong of the
copyright infringement test, the inquiry regarding whether the
the copyrightability of the transaction codes. Consequently, the trans-
action codes are protected.
Id.
290. 798 F. Supp. 1499 (D. Colo. 1992), modified, No. 92-S-136, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13601 (D. Colo. Aug. 12, 1992).
291. Id. at 1503.
292. Id. at 1509.
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two programs were substantially similar, the court found it im-
practical to attempt to categorize the various tests advanced by
earlier decisions, which had been decided "on a case-by-case ba-
sis [that] led to a proliferation of different descriptive terms asso-
ciated with particular holdings which have generated more heat
than light." '293
The court identified three different tests for the determination
of substantial similarity. The first of these was Whelan's collaps-
ing of the extrinsic/intrinsic test into a single inquiry incorporat-
ing both lay and expert opinions. Second, the court characterized
Computer Associates' "abstraction test" as a "rather extreme al-
ternative [which] may be rendered unimportant if [it] is used as a
prelude to, instead of as a substitution for" the Whelan test.2 94
Finally, the court cited Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc. ,295 in
which the Fourth Circuit, in evaluating a copyright claim involv-
ing a musical arrangement, had modified the intrinsic test to al-
low the substitution in some circumstances of the impressions of
an ordinary lay observer for those of a specialized audience.296
293. Id. at 1510-11.
294. Id. at 1513. Certainly, Whelan's expansive definition of protectable "ex-
pression" would add considerable weight to the "golden nugget" isolated by
Computer Associates. For example, as discussed further in the context of Softel
v. Dragon Medical & Scientific Communications, Inc., No. CIV. 0167 (JMC),
1992 WL 168190 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 1992), discussed supra note 285, elements
dictated by efficiency might be excluded from the "substantial similarity" analy-
sis by Computer Associates but not necessarily by Whelan.
295. 905 F.2d 731 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 511 (1990).
296. When conducting the second prong of the substantial similarity
inquiry, a district court must consider the nature of the intended audi-
ence of the plaintiff's work. If, as will most often be the case, the lay
public fairly represents the intended audience, the court should apply
the lay observer formulation of the ordinary observer test. However,
if the intended audience is more narrow in that it possesses specialized
expertise, relevant to the purchasing decision, that lay people would
lack, the court's inquiry should focus on whether a member of the
intended audience would find the two works to be substantially simi-
lar. Such an inquiry may include, and no doubt in many cases will
require, admission of testimony from members of the intended audi-
ence or, possibly, from those who possess expertise with reference to
the tastes and perceptions of the intended audience.
Id. at 736.
Dawson had agreed with Whelan that "only a reckless indifference to com-
mon sense would lead a court to embrace a doctrine that requires a copyright
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From these variant tests, the Gates Rubber court derived its own:
it applied the intrinsic/extrinsic test of Whelan, giving "substan-
tially greater weight to the extrinsic prong," which nonetheless
was "limited dramatically. "2 9' As had Dawson, the court ac-
knowledged the "importance and technical nature of the expert
testimony,"29 but restricted the impact of that testimony to fac-
tual determinations. Once these expert opinions were received,
the court proceeded to apply the Computer Associates abstrac-
tion/filtration/comparison test, "to ensure that [the previous
tests did] not allow for the protection of any unprotectable
ideas."2 99
Under the extrinsic test, the court heard the testimony of three
experts: Dr. Randall Davis, who had been the court's expert in
Computer Associates, here testified for the plaintiff;3 °" Dr. Wil-
liam Dorn, the defendants' expert; and Dr. William Clancey,
who had been selected by Drs. Davis and Dorn as an independ-
case to turn on the opinion of someone who is ignorant of the relevant differ-
ences and similarities between two works." Id. at 735.
297. Gates Rubber Co., 798 F. Supp. at 1513-14.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 1514.
This Court is of the opinion that it is far preferable, especially in an
area of legal and technological sophistication as complex as this area
of copyright protection, to draw upon a larger arsenal of facts in order
to design or derive the appropriate legally significant facts. Once these
are gathered and expert opinion is heard, the court can then analyze
which portions of the program, according to the expert testimony, in-
fringes [sic] the protected expression.
Id. at 1511. Thus, the court found it "only logical that [the Computer Associ-
ates] analysis would be undertaken after the application of the substantial simi-
larity test, at which time the fact-finder has determined whether the work is a
'plagiarizing work' of the copyrighted work." Id. at 1516. Rejecting Gates's
argument that the "filtration" process should precede the substantial similarity
analysis, the court indicated that tests performed in that order could "eviscerate
the application of" the Whelan test, without adding any compensating advan-
tages. Id. Moreover, the reservation of the Computer Associates test for the
final stage of the process "serves as a guard against unprotectable elements be-
ing considered in the legal conclusion of whether there is infringement (based
on the factual considerations of the extrinsic and intrinsic tests)." Id.
300. Observing that this expert's opinion of Whelan had been in part respon-
sible for Computer Associates' rejection of that standard, the Gates Rubber court
nonetheless declined to "second guess Dr. Davis' understanding of [that] hold-
ing." Id. at 1512 n.ll.
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ent expert.30 1 The experts found: identical constants; substantial
similarities in the programs' factual findings were that the menus,
formulas, data flow, control flow, install files, behavior of Engi-
neering Calculation modules, fundamental tasks, sorting criteria
(organization of data), and common errors/misbehaviors; simi-
larities in the "look and feel," in levels of complexity, and in the
overall structure and organization of Design Modules; differences
in programming style; but no similarity or evidence of copying of
object or source code.30 2 The court agreed with Dr. Davis that
Bando American's Chauffeur program had been copied from
Gates Rubber's Data Flex program.30 3
As for the intrinsic test, Judge Sparr, who acknowledged "be-
ing largely unfamiliar with computers and their processes," ob-
served at a demonstration "significant similarities in the running
of the two programs: while the appearance of the screens was
different, the content and method of proceeding through calcula-
tions were quite similar, as was the overall operation of the two
programs. 34
In applying the Computer Associates test, the court arrayed
various elements of the programs along the "idea/expression"
continuum, ranging from the "look and feel" of the program,
which was more connected with the "idea" of the program, to
the engineering module30 5 and the data flow and control flow,
301. Id. at 1514. Dr. Clancey's comparison points between the two pro-
grams were "the identity of the programmer; whether the material was unpub-
lished; the relationship between concepts and constants; the population of
similar programs in the world; the derivability of portions of the programs; and
the range, space and alternative designs." Id. Dr. Davis's analysis focused on
similarities between the programs' "arrangement, the types of choices available
and their presentation; data flow, which he described as being analogous to 'rec-
ipe,'; control flow, which is the sequence of events; and the sequence, which is
the sequence of behaviors and internal functions." Id. Dr. Dom's testimony
was largely confined to the means by which the two programs could have been
independently developed. Id. at 1515.
302. Id. at 1516.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 1518. This module
falls closer to the expression range because, although the pure engi-
neering aspect in a broad sense may be more likely to be not protected,
the relevant engineering modules in the two programs contain particu-
lar elements that perform in similar manners. The [module contain-
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which were closer to expression. 306 Diverging from Computer
Associates, the court also held that copyright protection could ex-
tend to a program's behavior - in this case, its "common errors
and misbehaviors.
' 30 7
Although the formulas behind Design Flex, which appeared in
identical form in Chauffeur, were not protectable because they
had been previously published,3 °8 the court found that the ap-
pearance in Chauffeur of "numerous" protectable portions of De-
sign Flex, and in particular of the mathematical constants, which
no other program except Chauffeur had a need to duplicate, im-
plicated Bando American in the copyright infringement of Gates
Rubber's program.3
Thus, the court issued an injunction restraining Bando from
using or distributing Chauffeur and ordering it to retrieve all ex-
isting copies of that program from the hands of third parties for
return to the court and to return to Gates Rubber all copies of
the Design Flex program in Bando's possession.
B. The Lotus Trilogy: Reconciling Computer Associates with
Paperback
In Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc. ,310
the latest in a series of rulings on Lotus's copyright infringement
claims against Borland,3 ' the District Court of Massachusetts
ing algorithms for belt design] is somewhat more difficult as it involves
algorithms, or procedures for solving given types of mathematical
problems.
Id.
The court declined to hold that the algorithms were not protectable by copy-
right law. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. "A particular example of common error concerns the minimum/
maximum error where both programs, upon receiving a particular answer, erro-
neously take the user back to another part of the program," thus revealing the
interconnection of different parts of the program. Id. The court found that this
error was "part of the creative expression of the program itself." Id. at 1518-19.
308. Id. at 1519.
309. Id.
310. 799 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1992).
311. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mass.
1992) (Memorandum and Order holding that Lotus did not properly frame its
allegations that Borland had infringed copyright on elements of user interface);
1993]
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granted in part Lotus's motion for summary judgment and de-
nied Borland's motion for summary judgment. In concluding
that Borland's spreadsheet program Quattro Pro infringed on the
copyright of Lotus 1-2-3 (1-2-3), the court equated its own three-
part test for software infringement with the analysis of Computer
Associates, which, like Whelan itself, had not been intended to
cover screen displays.31 2
1. Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software
International (1990)
In Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software Interna-
tional,313 Judge Keeton extensively analyzed the idea/expression
distinction before concluding that the defendant's program, VP-
Planner, had infringed on 1-2-3. After reviewing the existing
case law and commentary in depth, the court advanced the fol-
lowing "statement of the most significant elements of the legal
test for copyrightability":
314
FIRST, in making the determination of "copyrightability,"
the decisionmaker must focus upon alternatives that counsel
may suggest, or the court may conceive, along the scale from
the most generalized conception to the most particularized,
and choose some formulation - some conception or definition
of the "idea" - for the purpose of distinguishing between the
idea and its expression....
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990)
(user interface of Lotus 1-2-3 is copyrightable).
312. "As a caveat, we note that our decision here does not control infringe-
ment actions regarding categorically distinct works, such as certain types of
screen displays. These items represent products of computer programs, rather
than the programs themselves, and fall under the copyright rubric of audiovi-
sual works. If a computer audiovisual display is copyrighted separately as an
audiovisual work, apart from the literary work that generates it (ie., the pro-
gram), the display may be protectable regardless of the underlying program's
copyright status." Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693,
703 (2d Cir. 1992). "In this case ... we are concerned not with a program's
display, but the program itself, and then with only its non-literal components."
Id.
Cf. Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. CAMS, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984 (D.
Conn. 1989) (applying extrinsic/intrinsic test to find copyright infringement of
screen displays).
313. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
314. Id. at 60.
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SECOND, the decisionmaker must focus upon whether an
alleged expression of the idea is limited to elements essential
to expression of that idea (or is one of only a few ways of
expressing the idea) or instead includes identifiable elements
of expression not essential to every expression of that idea.
THIRD, having identified elements of expression not essen-
tial to every expression of the idea, the decisionmaker must
focus on whether those elements are a substantial part of the
allegedly copyrightable "work."
315
Under the second element of this test, the court compared such
spreadsheet programs as 1-2-3, Visicalc, and Excel, and deter-
mined that the "rotated 'L' " configuration of the screen display
was not only common but indeed one of only a few ways of por-
traying a spreadsheet on a computer screen.316 Similarly, a popu-
lar and practical feature involving "the designation of a
particular key that, when pressed, will invoke the menu com-
mand system" could be implemented in a limited number of
ways, i.e., by using one of the few keys not reserved for numbers,
letters and mathematical operations. The copyrightability of
choosing the slash key "/" for this operation was therefore disfa-
vored, as was the use of the keys "+", "-", "" and "/" (within
formulas) to indicate addition, subtraction, multiplication, and
division, respectively.317
However, the court held that a program's visual presentation
of the various memo commands in a "main menu command
line":
315. Id. at 60-61.
316. Id. at 66. However, the idea of using a "two-line moving cursor," while
"functional and obvious" and common, did not automatically render a menu
system noncopyrightable, since a developer might be able to add to this feature
"substantial elements of expression, distinctive and original, which are thus
copyrightable." Id. at 65.
A two-line moving cursor "presents the user with a list of command
choices (e.g., 'file', 'copy', 'quit') and a moving cursor to use in com-
municating ('entering') the choice .... The top line of the menu con-
tains a series of words, each of which represents a different
command.... The second line of the menu displays a 'long prompt,'
which contains further information about the highlighted command."
Id. at 63-64.
317. Id. at 66-67. The court also noted that to ease the user's access to this
feature, "the user should not be required to press two keys at the same time" to
invoke the command system. Id. at 66.
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is not essential to the electronic spreadsheet idea, nor does it
merge with the somewhat less abstract idea of a menu struc-
ture for an electronic spreadsheet. The idea of a menu struc-
ture - including the overall structure, the order of commands
in each menu line, the choice of letters, words or "symbolic
tokens" to represent each command, the presentation of these
symbolic tokens on the screen (i.e., first letter only, abbrevia-
tions, full words, full words with one or more letters capital-
ized or underlined), the type of menu system used (i.e., one-,
two- or three-line moving-cursor menus, pull-down menus, or
command-driven interfaces), and the long prompts - could
be expressed in a great many if not literally unlimited number
of ways.31
Thus, the menu structure was copyrightable under the second
step of the court's copyrightability test. The distinctiveness of
the "structure, sequence and organization of the menu command
system" of 1-2-3, as well as the trouble that Paperback Software
and codefendant Stephenson Software, Ltd. had taken to copy it,
satisfied the third element of the Paperback copyrightability test
as well.319
2. Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc.,
788 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mass. 1992)320
Over two years later, the court addressed similar issues in the
context of Lotus's allegations that Borland's spreadsheet pro-
grams Quattro and Quattro Pro infringed on 1-2-3. At issue was
the copyrightability of the "user interface" of 1-2-3, which "in-
cludes such elements as 'the menus (and their structure and or-
ganization), the long prompts, the screens on which they appear,
the function key assignments, [and] the macro commands and
language.' ,321
In dividing the issues between the judge and jury, Judge Kee-
318. Id. at 67.
319. Id. at 68.
320. 788 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mass. 1992).
321. 740 F. Supp. 37, 63 (D. Mass. 1990) (quoting Lotus's Post-Trial Brief at
53). Several of these elements, and other relevant terms, were themselves de-
fined in Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 799 F. Supp. 203, 206 (D. Mass.
1992):
"Command" refers to an abbreviated description of a direction that
a user of a software program (whether Lotus 1-2-3, Borland's Quattro
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ton questioned whether "substantial similarity" and "copyright-
ability" were issues "in which law and fact are so deeply
intertwined that, at least as a practical matter if not strictly in
principle as well, total separation cannot be achieved." '322 The
court denied the cross-motions for summary judgment, instead
allowing the parties to restate their motions in light of the clarifi-
Pro, or another program) may invoke to cause some operation to be
performed.
"Menu" refers to a display on the computer monitor of a limited
number of commands available to the user at a given moment.
"Menu command" refers to a command that appears in a menu. In
Lotus 1-2-3, a menu command is ordinarily a single English-language
word. In rare instances, it is instead a representation of an English-
language pronunciation (such as "Xtract"). Menu commands are dis-
played on the computer monitor by the 1-2-3 program in a succession
of menus. The menus communicate to the user, in sequence, the
spreadsheet operations available to the user.
"Command structure" refers to the organization of the menus and
menu commands. (Other phrases used with essentially the same
meaning include "menu command structure," "menu hierarchy," and
"menu command hierarchy.") In Lotus 1-2-3, menu commands are
organized so that less than a dozen related menu commands are dis-
played at any given moment. This display communicates to the user
the spreadsheet operations immediately available. Each menu of less
than a dozen commands is linked to the preceding/succeeding menus
by the operation of menu commands. All command menus are ulti-
mately linked to a singly main (root/trunk) menu to form a "menu
tree."
"Keystroke sequence" refers to a sequence of keystroke entries that
a user may invoke. Keystroke sequences may be generated as one
navigates the menu command hierarchy performing sequential
spreadsheet operations.
"Long prompt" refers to a displayed multi-word English-language
description of a "highlighted" menu command. A "highlighted"
menu command appears on the computer monitor as a block of in-
verse video - that is, on a monochrome monitor with a black back-
ground on which characters are lit, a highlighted word appears as
black letters within a lit block.
"Macro language" refers to a feature by which a user may define a
very short keystroke sequence as equivalent to a longer keystroke se-
quence. Thus, a user may invoke the short keystroke sequence (a
"macro") as a substitute for the longer keystroke sequence.
322. 788 F. Supp. at 83-84. The Paperback analysis of giving copyright-
ability issues to the jury had been mooted by the stipulation of the parties, in
agreeing to a phased trial involving no jury for Phase One, that the court alone
decide such fact questions in that stage of the proceedings. Id. at 94-95.
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cation set forth in the opinion.323
The court also revised the Paperback three-part test in two
ways. First, in response to an amicus brief filed by eleven profes-
sors of intellectual property law, the court substituted references
to " 'idea," 'system,' "process,' procedure,' or 'method' " for the
term "idea," to accentuate "the difference between a useful pro-
cess and an original expression. "324 In addition, the third part of
the test was amended to indicate that the inquiry would focus on
whether non-essential expressive elements, "taken together,"
constituted a substantial part of the allegedly infringed work, and
were thus copyrightable.3 25  Thus revised, these guidelines
formed one suggested jury question (of mixed fact and law) on
copyrightability.326
Yet even this formulation left juries unaccountable for their
reasoning, and "free as a practical matter to reach decisions in-
consistent with the balance struck by Congress, as interpreted by
the courts," thus inevitably making such verdicts unpredict-
able327 and the litigations longer, more complex and more expen-
321sive.  Since neither the Copyright Act nor the Constitution
mandates that juries decide factual issues relating to copyright-
ability, the court held that "at least in the circumstances of this
case (and probably more generally, though I need not so deter-
mine here), the issue or issues of copyrightability, including any
fact questions bearing upon them, must be determined by the
court, not the jury. ' 329 However, the court gave the parties the
opportunity to submit clarified forms of instructions on
323. Though generally judges decide issues of law and juries issues of fact,
"mixed" issues of law and fact demand one of two special procedures. Id. at
82-83. The court could first decide the issues of law and then submit the rele-
vant factual questions to the jury for decision embedded in mixed questions of
law and fact. Id. The jury decision then constitutes a "special verdict" under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 49(a) or a "general verdict accompanied
by answers to interrogatories" under Rule 49(b). Id. Alternatively, the court
could submit only fact questions to the jury. Such questions qualify as "special
questions" under Rule 49(a) or as "interrogatories" under Rule 49(b). Id.
324. Id. at 90 (emphasis in original).
325. Id.
326. Id. at 93.
327. Id. at 95.
328. Id. at 96.
329. Id.
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copyrightability to the jury.33 0
Significantly, Judge Keeton rejected Borland's argument
(which would later be made by Computer Associates) that the
determination of "copyrightability," that is, an identification of
the protectable elements of the plaintiff's program, should pre-
cede the inquiry into whether the defendant had copied such an
element or elements. Although Concrete Machinery had adopted
the approach recommended by Borland,33 the Lotus court found
that "pattern of analysis and decisionmaking... is not meant to
be a straitjacket [and] need not be applied to a case in which
there are compelling practical reasons for a different order or
proceeding." '332 The court thus suggested a verdict form asking
first whether the jury found that the Quattro Pro user interface as
a whole was copied from the 1-2-3 user interface as a whole; next
asking whether a specific part of the Quattro Pro user interface
(the "emulation interface" or the "macro facility") as a whole
was so copied; and then asking which part of the copied interface
or facility had been copied into some part of Quattro Pro.333
3. Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc.,
799 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1992)
Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc. ,3 af-
forded the court several opportunities to observe that its own Pa-
330. Id.
331. As a preliminary matter, the court can 'dissect' the copyrighted
work to identify those aspects of the expression that are not necessar-
ily mandated by the idea it embodies.... By dissecting the accused
work and identifying those features which are protected in the copy-
righted work, the court may be able to determine as a matter of law
whether or not the former has copied protected aspects of the latter.
The court can also determine, in at least a general way, those aspects
of the work that are protected by the copyright and that should be
considered in the subsequent comparative analysis under the ordinary
observer test. Assuming copying of protected aspects is established,
the trier of fact can then assess pursuant to the "ordinary observer"
test whether there is substantial similarity between the protected ex-
pression and the accused work.
Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 608-09
(1st Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
332. Borland, 788 F. Supp. at 86.
333. Id. at 87-88.
334. 799 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1992).
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perback test for "copyrightability" was "compatible
substantively though different in methodology" '335 from the ab-
straction/filtration/comparison test of Computer Associates.a36
The "abstraction" process, which corresponds to the Lotus first
step of identifying a "formulation... for the purpose of distin-
guishing between the idea and its expression," was similarly de-
rived from Judge Hand's opinions.337 Moreover, Judge Keeton's
second step, which determined whether a work that was allegedly
copyrightable as an expression contained elements not required
to express that idea, conformed to the Computer Associates "fil-
tration" process. 3 ' Finally, the third Lotus step, which con-
cerned whether the unessential elements were a substantial part
of the allegedly infringed work, was included in the Computer
Associates "comparison" process. The Second Circuit had added
only a further comparison of the two works to determine whether
the allegedly infringing work had duplicated a substantial part of
the plaintiff's work's copyrightable elements.339
Indeed, Judge Keeton noted that the Second Circuit had not
taken significant issue with Paperback or with the March 20 Lo-
tus Order.3"° Nor had the Second Circuit's rejection of Whelan
335. Id. at 212.
336. The court found no "substantive implications.., and... especially, not
for this case" in the Second Circuit's description of the Computer Associates test
as one for "substantial similarity" rather than for "copyrightability." Id. at
215.
337. Id. at 211-12.
338. Id. at 212.
339. Id.
340. The Second Circuit had observed that "[w]hile incentive based argu-
ments in favor of broad copyright protection are perhaps attractive from a pure
policy perspective, [citing Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F.
Supp. 37, 58 (D. Mass. 1990)], ultimately, they have a corrosive effect on cer-
tain fundamental tenets of copyright doctrine." Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d
693, 712 (2d Cir. 1992) (criticizing an incentive-based reason stated at one point
in the Paperback opinion). "The criticized argument, however, was by no
means essential to the outcome in Paperback, and acceptance or rejection of
that outcome is not likely to affect the outcome in this case." Borland, 799 F.
Supp. at 212.
Similarly, the district court noted that its application of the merger doctrine
to extend copyright protection to "certain non-literal, noncode (nonstructural)
aspects of the 1-2-3 spreadsheet in Paperback" had been approved by the Sec-
ond Circuit. Borland, 799 F. Supp. at 214 (citing Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d
at 709).
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affected the validity of Paperback: not only was Computer Asso-
ciates not binding authority in the First and Third Circuits, but
also, unlike Whelan, Paperback had recognized that one com-
puter program (or, in that case, the 1-2-3 interface) could contain
more than one idea.a41
The court rejected Borland's claim that the 1-2-3 interface was
designed around the nature of the user macros with which it
would interact, and was thus not copyrightable under the Com-
puter Associates filtration test. Although program elements dic-
tated by the specifications of preexisting hardware or software
would not be copyrightable under the Second Circuit's test, the
court determined as a matter of fact that "[t]he Lotus 1-2-3 inter-
face - or at least a version of it - was written first. All user
macros derive from it."'342 In fact, although the keystrokes as-
signed by Lotus to its various macros were "necessarily" dupli-
cated by later programs seeking compatibility, the first set had
been chosen arbitrarily.3 43
Just as the court's March 20 Order3 " had not been contained
by the order of the copyrightability test enunciated in Concrete
Machinery, so did Judge Keeton's July 31 decision decline to
view either the First Circuit's approach or "the Second Circuit's
three-step test.. . as a rigid barrier to alternate methods of analy-
sis and decision."34 The court therefore initiated the copyright-
ability analysis despite unresolved factual issues concerning
elements of the interface and the degree to which the interface
design had been dictated by functional considerations.346
341. Borland, 799 F. Supp. at 215. See Paperback, 740 F. Supp. at 64-65
(analyzing copyrightability of idea of electronic spreadsheet, of two-line moving
cursor, and of specific macro commands); Borland, 799 F. Supp. at 215 ("[Tlhe
Second Circuit criticized the Whelan decision for reasons that in large part do
not apply to the rulings I made in Paperback or to the rulings I have made and
now make in this case.").
342. 799 F. Supp. at 213. Nor did the court accept Borland's argument that
the assignment of different individual letters to the various commands on each
menu was a "functional constraint"; "other symbolic tokens," such as numbers,
could be used. Id.
343. Id. at 213-14.
344. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mass.
1992).
345. 799 F. Supp. at 215.
346. Id. at 216.
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In applying the first step of its test, the court set forth five
alternative formulations of 1-2-3.347 Immediately, it rejected the
most specific conception of the program's "idea," which corre-
lated each menu command to others: the adoption of this formu-
lation would deny copyrightability to the entire interface, leaving
the way clear for Borland legitimately to incorporate the entire
menu structure of 1-2-3 into its own products. 34s By also dis-
carding the most abstract formulation of 1-2-3, as "an electronic
spreadsheet," because it set "an inappropriately abstract bound-
ary between idea and expression," the court championed the
analysis of Computer Associates over that of Whelan.
Determining that "the selection of functional operations that
the spreadsheet performs must be considered part of the idea of
the program,, 349 the court selected the second most specific op-
347. In order, from the most abstract to the most particular, the selections
were:
(1) Lotus 1-2-3 is an electronic spreadsheet.
(2) It is a menu-driven electronic spreadsheet.
(3) Its user interface involves a system of menus, each menu con-
sisting of less than a dozen commands, arranged hierarchically, form-
ing a tree in which the main menu is the root/trunk of the tree and
submenus branch off from higher menus, each submenu being linked
to a higher menu by operation of a command.
(4) Its user interface involves a system of menus, each menu con-
sisting of less than a dozen commands, arranged hierarchically, form-
ing a tree in which the main menu is the root/trunk of the tree and
submenus branch off from higher menus, each submenu being linked
to a higher menu by operation of a command, so that all the specific
spreadsheet operations available in Lotus 1-2-3 are accessible through
the paths of the menu command hierarchy.
(5) Finally, one may conceive of the interface as that precise set of
menu commands selected by Lotus, arranged hierarchically precisely
as they appear in 1-2-3. Under this conception, the interface com-
prises the menu of commands "Worksheet," "Range," "Copy,"
"Move," "File," "Print," "Graph," "Data," "System," and "Quit,"
linked by operation of the command "Worksheet" to the menu of
commands "Global," "Insert," "Delete," "Column," "Erase," "Ti-
tles," "Windows," "Status," and "Page," etc. (The completion of this
proposed statement of the "idea," listing all of the more than 400
commands for which "etc." stands, would require several dozen more
lines of text.)
Id.
348. Id. at 217.
349. Id.
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tion for a formulation of the 1-2-3 user interface, which described
the structure of the hierarchical system of menus which among
them granted access to all of the 1-2-3 spreadsheet operations."' 0
In the second step of the process, the court identified the spe-
cific menu commands and command structure of 1-2-3 as ele-
ments of expression. Not only had Borland actually created a
variant of this structure for incorporation into Quattro Pro, but
Lotus' menu and submenu commands themselves (e.g., "Work-
sheet," "Range," "Copy," "Move," "File," and "Print") could
easily have been renamed to create "a sufficient alternate method
of implementing the system."' 35' Finally, the apparent ordering
of the menu commands "in order of the expected frequency of
use" was not so dictated by functional concerns that "at least
hundreds and perhaps thousands" of alternative expressions of
the commands were not still possible.352
Under the third step, the court found that the menu com-
mands, menu command hierarchy, macro languages and keys-
troke sequences were a substantial part of 1-2-3, and indeed that
"[n]o reasonable jury could find otherwise. '353 "That is, a rea-
sonable fact-finder must conclude that the Quattro programs de-
rive from illicit copying. The emulation interfaces are
substantially similar in the mixed law-fact sense to the Lotus 1-2-
3 user interface.
354
The court scheduled a jury trial on the issue of whether the
long prompts of the 1-2-3 interface had been infringed by Quattro
350. Id. See supra note 347 (Option (4)).
351. Id. at 218.
352. Id. The court also observed: (a) that the ordering would have reflected,
at best, only Lotus's predictions of the frequency of the command use; (b) that
the validity of such predictions would depend on the user and his or her uses of
the spreadsheet; (c) an apparent exception in this ordering; and (d) the vague-
ness of the "order" of commands in "wraparound" horizontal menus through
which users could move either left or right. Id. at 218-19. Thus, "the arrange-
ment of menu commands according to predicted frequency of use is not a major
functional limitation on the number of arrangements of menu commands." Id.
at 219.
By contrast, a jury might find the grouping of menu commands by function a
functional concern, although the resolution of this factual issue would only af-
fect the scope of Lotus's relief. Id. at 218.
353. Id. at 219.
354. Id. at 221.
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Pro. Since the court had already held, after comparing the two
programs as a whole, that Quattro Pro infringed 1-2-3, the only
questions left unresolved, in the determination of damages, were
(a) whether (in the view of the jury) Borland copied the long
prompts as well and (b) whether (in the eyes of the court) the
long prompts were copyrightable expressive elements of 1-2-3.
"There would be no need to ask separately whether the copying
of the long prompts would alone, or in combination, render the
Quattro programs substantially similar to Lotus 1-2-3."' 5
C. Unlocking the Door: Reverse Engineering
356
Though not condoning the incorporation into Altai's products
of Computer Associates' source code for ADAPTER, the Second
Circuit appeared to legitimize Altai's "clean room" stratagem for
removing the pirated code from OSCAR 3.4.357 Two recent cir-
cuit court decisions in the context of video games have approved
competitors' use of technological methods to extract the code of
"lockout" or "lock and key" subprograms from commercially
available products of their rivals 358 in order to achieve compati-
355. Id.
356. "Reverse engineering" has been defined by the Supreme Court as "a fair
and honest means [of] starting with the known product and working backward
to divine the process which aided in its development or manufacture."
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
In the software context,
[dlisassembly is the process of translating a machine language
program into an assembly language program; decompilation is the
process of translating a machine language program into a high-level
program. . . . There are currently no commercially available
decompilers. It appears that the term "decompilation," as it is used in
the policy debate, encompasses disassembly and any other procedure
by which a machine language program is translated into a more
understandable form. There are a number of disassembler programs
available on the market.
FINDING A BALANCE, supra note 3, at 7.
357. See supra notes 72, 177.
358. The OTA's report suggested that, to resolve issues concerning reverse
engineering, Congress could: modify the scope and subject matter of copyright
protection for software; direct the Copyright Office to develop guidelines for the
"fair use" of software and the "essential steps in the utilization" of programs; or
legislatively specify the status of reverse engineering under the "fair use" doc-
trine. FINDING A BALANCE, supra note 3, at 31.
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bility.359 Not only do these endorsements of "reverse engineer-
ing" rely on the analysis of Computer Associates, but developers
obtaining source or object codes in this manner will clearly be
encouraged to subject them to the abstraction/filtration/compar-
ison test to gauge the limits of permissible similarity. Notably,
among the elements of the original program that would be
"filtered out" as not protectable under Computer Associates are
those determined by such external factors as "compatibility re-
quirements of other programs with which a program is designed
to operate in conjunction" and "the demands of the industry be-
ing serviced." 3"
In holding that Atari had infringed on the "lock and key"36
program contained in Nintendo's home video game system, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit noted Computer Associ-
ates's and Brown Bag's agreement on "separating the program [at
issue] into manageable components [to ease] the court's task of
discerning the boundaries of protectable expression"; it then ap-
plied the Second Circuit's filtration analysis to these
components.
362
359. See, e.g., Gary R. Ignatin, Let the Hackers Hack. Allowing the Reverse
Engineering of Copyrighted Computer Programs to Achieve Compatibility, 140
U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2023 (1992) (one case in which reverse engineering is
particularly justified is in making new program compatible with existing copy-
righted software).
360. Computer Assocs. Int'l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 710 (2d Cir.
1992).
361. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d. 832 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
To protect the integrity of its Nintendo Entertainment System ("NES"),
which consists of a monitor, console and controls, Nintendo designed the
1ONES program, which would
prevent the NES from accepting unauthorized game cartridges. Both
the NES console and authorized game cartridges contain
microprocessors or chips programmed with the 1ONES. The console
contains a "master chip" or "lock." Authorized game cartridges con-
tain a "slave chip" or "key." When a user inserts an authorized car-
tridge into a console, the slave chip in effect unlocks the console; the
console detects a coded message and accepts the game cartridge.
When a user inserts an unauthorized cartridge, the console detects no
unlocking messages and refuses to operate the cartridge.
Nintendo's lONES program thus controls access to the NES.
Id. at 836.
362. Id. at 839.
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The basic principle of Nintendo's program, that is, the genera-
tion of a stream of data as a "key" to "unlock" the console, was
found to be an unprotectable idea.363 "After filtering [such] un-
protectable elements out of the lONES program," 3" the court
held that the specific "key" implemented by Nintendo was copy-
rightable as an expression, since many different such streams
could have been used.
3 6 5
Significantly, because the object code on the Nintendo com-
puter chip was not accessible or comprehensible without reverse
engineering, 366 the court upheld Atari's "peeling" of the
Nintendo 1ONES chips3 67 as a "fair use" under the Copyright
Act.368 However, "[tihis fair use did not give Atari more than
the right to understand the 1ONES program and to distinguish
the protected from the unprotected elements of the program.
Any copying beyond that necessary to understand the lONES
363. Id. at 840.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 843.
367. Reverse engineering, untainted by the purloined copy of the
1ONES program and necessary to understand 1ONES, is a fair use.
An individual cannot even observe, let alone understand, the object
code on Nintendo's chip without reverse engineering. Atari retrieved
this object code from NES security chips in its efforts to reverse engi-
neer the 10NES program. Atari chemically removed layers from
Nintendo's chips to reveal the 1ONES object code. Through micro-
scopic examination of the "peeled" chip, Atari engineers transcribed
the 1ONES object code into a handwritten list of ones and zeros.
While these ones and zeros represent the configuration of machine
readable software, the ones and zeros convey little, if any, information
to the normal unaided observer. Atari then keyed this handwritten
copy into a computer. The computer then "disassembled" [i.e., recon-
structed into "source code"] the object code or otherwise aided the
observer in understanding the program's method or functioning.
Id. at 843-44.
368. "'[Flair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction
in copies.., for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
... scholarship or research' is not infringement." 17 U.S.C. § 107, quoted in
1993] COMPUTER ASSOCIATES V. ALTAI
program was infringement."369 The similarities between the pro-
grams, excluding the idea of the "key" data stream, supported
infringement; for example, Atari's chip contained not only fea-
tures of the lONES program that were irrelevant to its own pro-
gram, but unnecessary instructions that Nintendo had
subsequently deleted from the program.3 7
Adopting the Computer Associates analysis "in light of the es-
sentially utilitarian nature of computer programs," Sega Enter-
prises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc. ,37 like Atari, extended the fair use
doctrine to permit "persons who are neither copyright holders
nor licensees to disassemble a copyrighted computer program in
order to gain an understanding of the unprotected functional ele-
ments of the program . . . when the person seeking the under-
standing has a legitimate reason for doing so and when no other
means of access to the unprotected elements exist. "372 The
method employed to capture the object code of the plaintiff's
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 842-43 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
Section 107 identifies the following factors as relevant to a determination of
"fair use":
(1) the purpose and character of such use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
To invoke this exception to the standards of copyright infringement, the re-
verse engineering process must have been applied to an authorized, Le., legiti-
mately obtained, copy of the plaintiff's work. 975 F.2d at 843.
369. Id. at 844.
370. Id. at 844-45.
371. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). This opinion was originally released by a
three-judge panel on October 20, 1992. Following Sega's petition for rehearing
and suggestion for rehearing en banc, the same panel amended the opinion on
January 6, 1993 by including a footnote specifically rejecting Sega's contention
that, under the logic of Atari, Sega's security code constituted protectable ex-
pression. Id. at 1524 n.7.
372. Id. at 1514. Because object code is generally incomprehensible to
humans, disassembly was necessary to discover the compatibility requirements
of the Genesis system. Even the "chip-peeling" or "clean room" techniques of
reverse engineering, the court noted, involved disassembly. Id. at 1525-26.
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video console locking mechanism differed from that in Atari,
3 7 3
but the result was the same. In determining that "Accolade cop-
ied Sega's code for a legitimate, essentially non-exploitative pur-
pose," the court stressed that Atari was not seeking to shirk the
effort of developing both its own programs, with their own code,
for the Sega system, or to avoid the payment for use of the inter-
face procedures for the Genesis console.374 Indeed, Accolade's
penetration of the Sega lock's defenses "has led to an increase in
the number of independently designed video game programs of-
fered for use with the Genesis console. It is precisely this growth
in creative expression, based on the dissemination of other crea-
tive works and the unprotected ideas contained in those works,
that the Copyright Act was intended to promote.
375
Sega v. Accolade was specifically amended to reject "Sega's be-
373. As part of the reverse engineering process, Accolade transformed
the machine-readable object code contained in commercially available
copies of Sega's game cartridges into human-readable source code us-
ing a process called 'disassembly' or 'decompilation.' Accolade
purchased a [Sega] Genesis console and three Sega game cartridges,
wired a decompiler into the console circuitry, and generated printouts
of the resulting source code. Accolade engineers studied and anno-
tated the printouts in order to identify areas of commonality among
the three game programs. They then loaded the disassembled code
back into a computer, and experimented to discover the interface
specifications for the Genesis console by modifying the programs and
studying the results. At the end of the reverse engineering process,
Accolade created a development manual that incorporated the infor-
mation it had discovered about the requirements for a Genesis-com-
patible game. According to the Accolade employees who created the
manual, the manual contained only functional descriptions of the in-
terface requirements and did not include any of Sega's code.
[In creating its own games for the Genesis,] Accolade did not copy
Sega's programs, but relied only on the information concerning inter-
face specifications for the Genesis that was contained in the develop-
ment manual. Accolade maintains that with the exception of the
interface specifications, none of the code in its own games is derived in
any way from its examination of Sega's code.
Id. at 1514-15.
374. Id. at 1523.
375. Id. The court also observed that the video market was not so limited
that the sale of an Accolade program would significantly affect the market for
the sale of a Sega program for a different type of game, or even for the same
type of game (e.g., Accolade's "Mike Ditka Power Football" versus Sega's "Joe
Montana Football."). Id. at 1523-24.
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lated suggestion" that the Sega lockout code, like that of
Nintendo's 1ONES program, was protectable as an expression.376
Declaring its opinion "entirely consistent" with the Federal Cir-
cuit's Atari decision, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the lONES
program as creative and original, and as copyrightable expression
of an idea - the generation of random streams of data to unlock
the software system - that could be accomplished in many dif-
ferent ways.
77
By contrast, the court found "Sega's key appears to be func-
tional [and thus noncopyrightable under Computer Associates].
It consists merely of 20 bytes of initialization code plus the letters
S-E-G-A. There is no showing that there is a multitude of differ-
ent ways to unlock the Genesis III console. 3a78 However, this
conclusion appears disarmingly facile. Even though not so elabo-
rate as that of Nintendo, Sega's protection system expresses the
idea of unlocking the Sega console by a short stream of data.
Moreover, S-E-G-A is hardly the only four-letter combination
that could have been selected as part of this "key."
As with Whelan, and with SAS and Q-Co, equity considera-
tions underlie the distinction between Atari, which upheld
Nintendo's preliminary injunctions against Atari on grounds of
copyright infringement, and Sega, which lifted Sega's similar in-
junction against Accolade.3 79 To obtain a reproduction of the
1ONES program from the Copyright Office, "Atari [had] falsely
alleged that it was a present defendant in a case in the Northern
District of California [and represented to] the 'Library of Con-
376. Id. at 1524 n.7.
377. Id. (citing Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832,
839 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
378. Id. The court also suggested that the small size of the Sega security
code deprived the code of protection, under the "words and short phrases doc-
trine." Id. (citing 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a)).
379. Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Recent Software Copyright Decisions,
N.Y. L.J., Oct. 13, 1992 at 3, 5. However, the original Sega opinion's applica-
tion of the "fair use" doctrine has been attacked on the grounds, inter alia, that:
(a) Accolade directly damaged Sega by reverse-engineering rather than paying
license fees for the Sega copyrights; (b) the exact lockout code used by Sega, as
one among many possible combinations of l's and O's, was a protectable ex-
pression; and (c) other methods of reverse engineering do not create unauthor-
ized interim copies. Martin Glenn & Dale Cendali, Sega Case Suggests
Protection Strategies, NAT'L. L.J., Jan. 18, 1993, at S2, S6.
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gress that the requested copy [would] be used only in connection
with the specified litigation.' "380 By contrast, where Accolade
had made no such misrepresentation and stood ready to invest its
own original efforts in producing programs for a competitor's
game system, Sega did not satisfy the court that the trademark
security system in the Sega products, which also invoked a screen
display of Sega's trademark and a message that the game was
produced by Sega, was "nonfunctional" and thus protectable.381
VI. CONCLUSION
Reconnoitering "the vast landscape of possible 'tests' for sub-
stantial similarity" 3 2 of computer software should be much sim-
plified by the Second Circuit's landmark "abstraction/ filtration/
comparison" analysis. Computer Associates v. Altai combines
copyright's idea/expression distinction, scenes a faire and merger
doctrines, and substantial similarity tests into an approach suita-
ble for assessing works that, unlike books and plays, have literary
aspects but are primarily functional.
Noteworthy in the Second Circuit's rejection of Whelan is the
court's detailed examination of a program's various levels of ab-
straction, from the "literal" levels of object code and source code
to the non-literal "structure, sequence and organization" of the
subprogram's arrangement and interaction. Elements of a pro-
gram will not merit copyright protection if they are dictated by
the nature of the program or by the necessary hardware, or if
they are in the public domain. Moreover, efficiency considera-
tions will remove other valuable features of software from the
"golden nugget" of a program's copyrightable material.
By their extensive analyses of the plaintiff's product, the Com-
puter Associates and Lotus v. Borland tests identify, and indi-
rectly invite the duplication of, the noncopyrightable elements of
market-leading programs. The dissemination of these features
380. Atari, 975 F.2d at 836 (quoting Atari's application to Copyright Office
for reproduction of 1ONES program).
381. Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1530-32 (9th
Cir. 1992).
382. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Am., Inc., 798 F. Supp. 1499, 1511 (D.
Colo. 1992).
COMPUTER ASSOCIATES V. ALTAI
may ultimately benefit not only the consumer but also the
software industry itself. This trend can only be encouraged by
the increased judicial tolerance of such reverse-engineering tech-
niques as "clean room" programming, chip "peeling" and
decompilation.
Nonetheless, various risks arise from the evidentiary aspects of
the Second Circuit's approach. Although the complex issues of
software design, development and programming demand expert
testimony, such evidence may be subtly biased or may range into
the area of legal analysis, even when introduced by a court-ap-
pointed expert.
Once Congress or the Supreme Court clarifies the issues ad-
dressed by Computer Associates, patent law may emerge as the
preferred mode of protection of computer programs. Until that
day, however, the appropriateness and effectiveness of copyright
protection for software's non-literal elements will undoubtedly
remain in flux.
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